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Chapter I
Introduction.
When the great war broke out in Europe in 1914, the
United States had no desire to enter into it, Tout preferred to
remain neutral, and this policy wa3 formally proclaimed by Presi-
dent Wilson on August 4, 1914. It will be well therefore to
consider what neutrality is, to set forth its characteristics,
in a word to define the term.
Neutrality is the condition of those states, which in
time of war take no interest in the contest, but continue pacific
intercourse with the belligerents. "Neutrality is in a sense,"
says Professor Lawrence, 1 "The continuation of a previously ex-
isting state and unless proof to the contrary is shown, neutral
states and their subjects are free to do in time of war between
other states what they were free to do in time of peace." He
states furthermore that international law has affixed to the
state of neutrals certain righta and obligations which do not
exist when there is no war and it is the setting forth of these
changes which constitutes the law of neutrality. Neutrality is
a blissful state of 'dolce far niente'.^ The duties of
neutral powers, said M. L*e'on Bourgeois at the Hague in 1907
may be 3ummed up in the obligation to do nothing. If it were
possible for a nation not interested in the war to do this -
1. Principles of International Law, p. 587.
2. Spaight, War Rights on Land, p. 472.

3that is, withdraw from all relations and intercourse with the
nations at war, we would have what might "be regarded as ideal
neutrality. Such an attitude is obviously an impossibility.
The neutral state could usually not afford to cut itself entire-
ly off from the belligerents - neither would it be to the advant-
age of the latter to be isolated from the rest of the world.
At the opposite extreme, neutral countries feel that the
mere existence of a war should not interfere with the ordinary
relations between them and belligerent states. Between these
views of absolute non-intercourse and non-intervention there has
been recognized a 'general compromise. 3 The neutral must do
nothing which would assist either belligerent in the struggle
and the belligerent will not interfere with any other relations
between the enemy and the neutral. This is not a well defined
line and as a consequence much difference of opinion exists as
to what constitutes aid in the struggle. 4*
It is not sufficient that a neutral aid the contending
belligerents impartially; because it is a practical impossibility,
says Professor Spaight, to help both belligerents in exactly the
same degree. ^ He says, it is obvious from the force of circum-
stances that the same measure of assistance may mean much more
to one than to the other; and therefore the neutral must help
3. Hall, International Law; 6 Edition, p. 71.
4. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish
American war; p. 13. "Every nation places its own interpreta-
tion upon the rights and obligations which belong to it under
international law. This is to say that national policies con-
stitute a strong and determining influence upon the principles
or usages of international law which a state is willing to re-
cognize and to observe in practice. On the borderlands of
international law are disputed questions, and national interests
influence the attitude toward such."
5. War Rights on Land, p. 473.

3neither. This is the first great principle of neutrality; the
neutral State, as such, must stand rigorously aloof from the con-
flict. "In its capacity as a state, friendly to both parties,
and within the sphere of its ordinary governmental activity it
must take reasonable steps to insure that a "belligerent suffers
no prejudice from its acts or omissions. nb
Such in general is neutrality; between this state of
affairs and belligerency, there is no half-way house. In a
note to Count Bernstorff, the Ambassador of the North German
Confederation to Great Britain, Earl Granville in 1870 declared
that 'benevolent neutrality 1 is a conception incompatible with
the nature and idea of neutrality. In fact, he said, it is no
neutrality "at all, e While the early writers distinguished be-
tween different degrees of neutrality, all present day writers
adopt the view of Earl Granville. If, says Professor Spaight,
the neutral State fails in its obligations the aggrieved belliger-
ent can call it to account, and, if the neutral continues to
render aid to the other belligerent, it commits a hostile act
which warrants the prejudiced party in regarding it as an active
ally of the enemy state. ^ Nor is there any exception to this
rule. No matter how just the cause of one and unjust the other,
a third nation cannot assist the one and at the same time, retain
the status of neutrality with its attending privileges.
There is, therefore, but one kind of neutrality. Im-
6. Ibid, p. 473.
7. Henry Clay said in the House of Representatives, January 24,
1817: "Whenever a state of war exists between two independent
states I know of but two relations in which other powers can
stand towards the belligerents; the one is that of neutrality,
and the other that of a belligerent.
8. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 61, pp. 759-750.
9. Op. Cit.
, p. 473.
li

4partial neutrality means simply neutrality, and benevolent neu-
trality means, assistance to one of the belligerents. There is,
however, a recognized distinction between the rights and duties
of a neutral State on the one hand and those of the individual
citizens who compose it on the other. 10 This may be considered,
a modern development, but it is nevertheless well established at
the present time. It is sufficient merely to mention the fact
here since it will be discussed more in detail later*
As was suggested above, the rights and duties of neutral
states have never been definitely defined. 11 The Neutrality
Convention drawn up by the Hague Conference in 1907 enumerates
certain fundamental principles governing the rights and duties
of neutral powers in case of war; Convention V deals with land
warfare and Convention XIII with maritime war. Mr. Scott, one
of the American delegates to the Conference tells us, IS that "the
framers of these Conventions felt that although only fragments,
they would serve to define neutrality until it might be possible
10. Oppenheim, Treatise on international Law, 1909; Vol. II,
p. 319; also Hall, International Law, 6 Ed, pp. 76-7.
11. Hall; 6 Ed. p. 72, also Lawrence; p. 587.
12. J. B. Scott, Texts of the Peace Conferences of theHague;
Introduction, p. XXIII. "The Fifth Convention attempts
to regulate the rights and duties of neutral powers and of
neutral persons in case of land warfare. Short, but im-
portant, its guiding 3pirit is expressed in the opening
paragraph of the preamble, namely, to render more certain
the rights and duties of neutral powers in case of warfare
upon land and to regulate the situation of belligerent re-
fugees in neutral territory.*** Its further definition
would involve us in technical details. n
"The Thirteenth Convention concerns and seeks to regulate
rights and duties of neutral powers in case of maritime war.
The Conference essayed to generalize and define on the one
hand the rights and neutrals and the correlative duties of
the belligerents, and in the second place to set forth in
detail the duties of neutrals, thus safeguarding the rights
of belligerents in certain phases of maritime warfare."
p. XXIX.

5to regulate as a whole the situation of neutrals in their rela-
tion to belligerents. n Many situations which arise in time of
war are not enumerated in either of the Conventions, because the
delegates could come to no agreement on them, while other problems
have arisen in the present war which were unknown in wars of the
past. Thus many problems require an individual solution, either
because there is no standing agreement or because there are no
precedents to follow.
In the present war there have arisen, as stated above
many new problems , and old problems have come up under new and
vastly different conditions, all of which have added to the diffi-
culty of maintaining a strict neutrality. It would be possible
to show that in this, the most extensive war of modern times,
with the consequent disruption of the normal commercial and
political relations of the world, the status of neutrality has
been more difficult to maintain than in any previous war. The
United States being the only member of the so called 'world
powers' not engaged in the struggle has perhaps felt the responsi-
bility most strongly.
However, it is not the purpose of this study to dwell on
general principles of neutrality, but rather to consider a few
specific problems that have arisen. The problems are considered
on the basis of international law and practice, but where the
matter is not covered by international law or precedents, the
surrounding facts are presented and the test of reason applied to
fundamental conceptions of neutrality. In all cases the attempt
is made to judge the problem from the view point of each of the
belligerents, and also from that of a third disinterested party.

Some of the questions taken up have been chosen because
of their technical importance; others because of their popular
interest.
It has been necessary to obtain much of the material
used in this study from the current literature; in all such
cases, allowance has been made for technical inaccuracies and
for prejudices which color contemporary events. As far as
possible official documents have been used; these have been
obtained directly from the State Department at Washington, from
the American Journal of International Law, or from the Congres-
sional Record.

7Chapter II
Submarine Cables and wireless Telegraphy.
The question of the status of submarine cables has
often
been a source of controversy between neutrals and
belligerents,
and this war is no exception. Science has still
further added
to the burden of obligations upon neutrals through the
perfection
of another means of communication, namely that of
wireless tele-
graphy, an invention which has played a very important
role in the
present war. . All the nations engaged in the war are
making use
of this means of communication in both land and sea
operations.
Owing to the very extensive use of wireless telegraphy
in this war, the question early arose as to how neutrals
should
deal with wireless stations on their territory. This
question
was first raised in the Russo-Japanese war in the form of
whether
or not a neutral should permit the use of its territory for
the
maintenance of belligerent communications by wireless.
1 The
fifth Hague Convention of 1907 forbids belligerents to erect
or
make use of wireless stations on neutral territory for purely
military purposes. But neutrals are not bound, to forbid or
restrict the use of cables or wireless apparatus belonging to
their governments or to private individuals; nevertheless the
convention stipulates that if any regulations are made in regard
to the matter they must be applied impartially to the several
belligerents.* At the beginning of the present war, there were
1. Oppenheim, Treatise on International Law, Vol. II, pp.
314-315.
3. Hague Convention V: Articles 3, 8, and 9.

very few precedents governing the obligations
of neutrals in re-
ject to the use of wireless telegraphy or its stations within
their territory, and the Hague Convention is clearly
not broad
enough to cover its wide range of service.
It is also clear that the rules governing the use
of sub-
marine cables could not be applied 'en bloc' to
wireless telegraphy,
in view of the great differences in the adaptability
of the two
means of communication. It was the early realization
of this
fact, and at the same time, a desire to maintain
strict neutrality
by refraining from helping either belligerent that
induced Presi-
dent Wilson on the day following his formal proclamation
of neu-
trality to order the establishment of a consorship of
wireless
stations- in the United States.
It was pointed out that by means of wireless telegraphy,
messages of a purely commercial nature, as for example the
an-
nouncement of the arrival or departure of a merchant-man
might
be intercepted by the cruisers of an enemy state and thus
the
message be as useful as military orders. In such a case
the
sending station would become a base of military operations.^
Since there is no means for a nation thus affected of preventing
such messages from being intercepted by its enemies, the
United
States Government deemed it to be a duty incumbent upon it
as a
neutral to censor the messages thus sent, whereas messages by
cables did not need to be censored. This, for the reason that
if
messages sent are obnoxious to the opposing belligerent he may
stop such communication by cutting the cables. The United States
adopted this means of preventing communication between the Spanish
3. The Independent . August 24, 1914.

Government and the forces in Cuba and the
Phillipines, during the
Spanish-American war. 4 The fact that cables can
be cut, and in
strict accordance with the international practiced
whereas there
is practically no means of preventing wireless
messages from
reaching their destination, constitutes the basis
of the American
position.
6
when England cut the German cables near the Azores,
soon
after the war broke out, Germany was greatly handicapped
by hav-
ing to communicate with the American continent exclusively
by
wireless and this handicap was increased when the American
wire-
less communication was subjected to a regime of censorship.
While no formal protest was made by the German Government,
the
German-American Chamber of Commerce protested to the President
against "Discrimination in government censorship of wireless
stations on our coasts as the German cables have been cut,
while
the English and French cables are open and practically
uncensored.
They charged that this policy was a serious discrimination
against
Germany, and this charge was repeatedly made by the German
press
in Germany and the United States.
There was nothing irregular in the cutting of the German
cables by the British. Such a proceeding is allowed by interna-
tional agreements; even the International Cable Convention of
4 Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-
American War; p. 151. Also Hershey, International Law
and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war, pp. l^i-i^.
5 See Rules adopted by the Institute of International Law
in its Session at Brussels, 1903, given in Eenton, Inter-
national Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War, p. *±1
6. Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence; European
War, 1915. No. 2, p. 58.

Paris of 1884 for the protection of submarine cables, had refer-
ence only to the protection of cables in time of peace, and it
expressly stated that belligerents may cut cables connected with
enemy territory, even if neutral owned. 7 The Institute of
International Law came to the same conclusion in 1902.°
As to the practice there is certainly no lack of precedent
for cutting cables. To recite a recent example, the United
States, during the Spanish-American war cut the cables around
Cuba," and also the cable between Manila and Hong Kong. iu
Furthermore the United States denied pecuniary liability for it
afterward. 11
Since submarine cables may be cut in order to prevent
their use for sending military information to a belligerent, the
responsibility is on the belligerent and not on the neutral;
exactly as in the case of intercepting contraband trade. "Thus,"
says Lawrence, "The simple principle that ocean cables are means
of communication is sufficient. When they are used by the enemy
they may be controlled, or in the last resort cut in any place
where it is lawful to carry on hostilities, without regard to
ownership or connection with neutral shores just as a railroad
passing through a hostile country may be torn up on enemy soil,
whether it is prolonged into neutral territory or not," 12
Hershey takes the same view. 13
7. Lawrence, Principles of International Law, p. 612.
8. Benton, Spanish American War, p. 211.
9. United States Foreign Relations , 1 898 : pp. 976-990 . D oaf>
10. Hershey, International Law as applied during the Russo-
Japanese War, p. 122.
11. Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 201.
12. Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 4 Ed. pp. 612-616
13. Hershey, Essentials of International Law, pp. 415-416.
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Westlake does not approve the American view; he says,
there is no doubt that a state is bound in principle not to al-
low the use of its services for the reception and transmission
of letters and telegrams, the latter whether wireless or not,
in furtherance of belligerent interests and where such service
is not a state monopoly, its exercise in the territory by a
private undertaking ought to be subject to similar restraint for
such use of the service would be a direct aid to the belligerent
and would make the territory a base of operations to that extent. 14
In taking this view, he assumes the general principles of communica-
tion aS being the same without considering the difference in the
possibilities of receiving measages or of interrupting them.
Lawrence however makes this careful distinction, "Belligerents
,
"
he says, "have a right to prevent messages sent by their enemies
over neutral means of communication and to this end may destroy
property at the bottom of the ocean. It is a violation of
neutrality to allow facilities to one belligerent for communicat-
ing by means of neutral territory between his forces in the
field and his government at home or his military and naval com-
manders in other parts of the theatre of operations. The
application of the last in the case of wireless receiving stations
is obvious. The nature of wireless telegraphy prevents the
application of the first," 15
In accordance with this latter principle it became neces-
sary for the United States to close the German wireless station at
Tuckerton, New Jersey on August 24, 1914. This action brought
forth a violent protest from the German-American Press. The pro-
14. Westlake, international Law, 3 Ed. Vol. II, p. 253.
15. War and Neutrality in the Far East; pp. 199-201.

—— "
~~7P
test charged the government with taking the position that the use
of seven cables by the British Government in sending code messages
was not unneutral, whereas the sending of such messages by wire-
less was unneutral when Germany had no means of communication
other than wireless.
On July 8, 1915, the Navy Department took over the wire-
less station at Sayville, L. I., which was the only remaining
privately owned and operated method of communication between the
United States and Germany. The step was taken at the request
of the Department of Commerce, it being held to be a necessary
step for the preservation of the neutrality of the United States.
Secretary Redf ield pointed out that the plant wa3 really German
owned, that it was completed since the war began, that it com-
municated only with points in Germany, and that German officers
of the Navy and Marine were kept stationed there. lo The sub-
marine situation undoubtedly led to this action, it being sup-
posed that the station communicated with German sub-marines re-
garding the sailing of vessels from American ports. Orders were
issued by the department that the effect of taking over the con-
trol of the plant would not change the status with respect to
commercial messages, as all which were accepted would be forwarded
by the United States Navy operators instead of commercial operators
the tolls to be turned over to the owners of the station.
The action of the United States was clearly in accord
with international law. 17 Neutrals are free to forbid or restrict
the use of wireless telegraphic apparatus whether belonging to
the government or a private company. If it prohibits or restricts.
16. Press Reports of July, 9, 1915.
17. Lawrence, International Law, p. 646.

it must be^partial and see that individuals do likewise. 16
The belligerent powers have acquiesced in the American
stand regarding cables and wireless telegraphy. There wsre some
portests due to lax enforcement, but in each case the President
and the State Department, sometimes, working with the Navy Depart-
ment and the Department of Commerce, made a thorough investigation
and came to satisfactory agreements with the complaining belli-
gerent. Notably among the instances arising was the action of
the station at Honolulu in giving publicity to the arrival of the
German warship, Geier. The President, Secretary Lansing and
Acting Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, in conference instructed
Rear Admiral Moore, in command of the Naval Station at Honolulu
to close the station unless satisfactory explanations were made
within twenty-four hours. It was found that the message was
sent while the censor's back was turned and the operator who
sent the message was severely reprimanded.
Another incident was the violation of the neutrality of
the Panama Canal Zone by the captain of the British Collier
Protesilaus. He received a message from outside the three mile
limit while his ship was in the canal zone, thereby violating
Rule 14 of the President's Panama Canal Zone Proclamation of
neutrality. Although the captain had not received official in-
formation of the new regulations prohibiting the use of radio
outfits in the canal except to canal business the British con-
ceded the action to be improper and so, upon receipt of the facts
in Washington, the incident was regarded as closed.
Following the naval battle off the coast of Chile between
18. Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 292, also
Bentwich, War and Private Property, p. 118.

the British and German squadrons, the British and French govern-
ments addressed protests to the governments of Colombia and
Ecuador against alleged violations of neutrality, chief among
which was the operation of wireless stations in the territories
of those countries by the Germans. The same protest was addressed
to the United States asking that our government "use its influence
to insure the strict enforcement of neutrality," on the parts of
Ecuador and Colombia. Secretary Bryan directed the Diplomatic
and Consular representatives of the United States in the two
countries to make a thorough investigation, both, in a formal way
with the governments and also by personal and independent inquiry.
The Colombian Minister to the United States replied that Colombia
had maintained the strictest neutrality ever since the outbreak of
the war and had made every effort to compel neutrality on the part
of citizens and foreigners under her control and he would guarantee
the most severe punishment to any offenders upon presentation of
evidence at Bogota. He further stated that the wireless station
complained about was now under government censorship in the same
manner as wireless stations in the United States, but that despite
the most active efforts of the government to maintain its neutral-
ity at all costs, one of the belligerents may have succeeded in
erecting wireless stations hidden somewhere along Colombia's long
coast line on the Altantic or Pacific. 19 On December 8, a number
of weeks after these protests the Colombian minister of Foreign
19. Some secret wireless stations are said to have been dis-
covered along the coast of Florida and Maine in the early
part of the war. One was also discovered at En3enada,
Lower California, ;ju8t a few miles across the United States
boundary line.

Affaire ordered the removal of the high power wireless station at
Cartagena on the coast of Bolivar because he felt the plant was
being operated by Germans for the transmission of news to German
war ships. The investigations made by the United States in re-
gard to this matter was evidently satisfactory, as no further
representations have been made.
The action of Turkey and also of Great Britain in barring
cable messages to neutral countries, which might in any way give
information concerning trade with the enemy, was entirely within
their own rights, as belligerents, and do not expecially concern
the United States 1, as a neutral power, although in the case of the
latter, many complaints of American business firms, both at home
and abroad, were carried to the British Foreign Office by the
State Department urging greater leniency in the censorship of in-
nocent commercial messages. 20
Summarizing, we find that the reasons why the United States
treated wireless and cable messages differently are: (1) Communica-
tions by wireless cannot be interrupted by a belligerent whereas
those by cable may be. Also since a cable is subject to hostile
attack, the responsiblity falls upon the belligerent to prevent
cable communication. (2) Wireless messages may be sent plain
or in cipher to direct the movements of warships or convey to
them information as to the location of an enemy's private or pub-
lic vessels - a use to which cables cannot be made. This would
make neutral territory a base of naval operations, to permit which
would be essentially unneutral. (3) As a wireless message can
be received by all stations and vessels within a given radius
SO. European War No. 3, Department of State, Diplomatic
Correspondence with Belligerent Governments. Relating to
Neutral Rights and Duties; pp. 71-94.

16
whatever its intended destination, all messages must be censored,
whereas in case of a cable, its very nature makes it incapable of
allowing the neutral territory to become a base of naval operation
by sending direct messages to war-ships.

17
Chapter III.
American Loans to the Belligerents.
Another question of some importance which arose early in
the H¥ar was that pertaining to war loans. The United States
Government was confronted with the question whether as a neutral
it should allow its nationals to make loans of money to the nations
engaged in the war.
Speaking "before the American Society of International Law
in 1908 on the question, 'How far should loans raised in neutral
countries for the use of "belligerents be considered a violation of
neutrality, 1 Professor Paul S. Reinsch drew the following signifi-
cant conclusions: (a) Under the present status of the law a neutral
nation could not be held responsible by a belligerent for having
allowed its subjects to make loans to the other party in the war.
(b) The general desire of combatants to avail themselves of the
opportunity to borrow money has in recent wars done away with the
motive on the part of the belligerents to object to that practice. 1
The great European war has confirmed the truth of these
propositions, for the belligerents have directly or indirectly
attempted to negotiate loans in this country, which is practically
the only market open to the world. The second proposition laid
down by Professor Reinsch has found its confirmation in the fact
that no belligerent has complained to the United States Government
for allowing its citizens to make loans to its enemies for the pur-
pose of carrying on the war.
f„ Proceedings" of the American Society of International, 'o8,pp.
84-
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The Government at Washington stated its attitude regard-
ing loans early in September, 1914, when the State Department gave
out the following notice in reply to certain inquiries as to the
attitude the government would take in case American bankers should
be asked to make loans to foreign governments during the war in
Europe: "There is no reason why loans should not be made to
the governments of belligerent nations, but in the judgment of
this government loans by American bankers to any foreign nation
which is at war is inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality!'
A short time later when J. P. Morgan, representing the
banking syndicate with which the French Government was seeking to
negotiate a loan, undertook to ascertain the attitude of the
government-, President Wilson expressed his disapproval of loans
to any of the belligerent governments on the broad grounds that
financial assistance of that kind might jeopardize the neutrality
of the country. The negotiations were thereupon broken off with
France and likewise with Austria, the latter government having,
at this time, been making inquiries about a loan of $100,000,000
in America.
3
Since that time the Allies and two or three neutral
nations which have since become involved in the war bought large
quantities of supplies in this country. Payment for these was
not made in gold but provisions were made for payment by credit,
2. The Literary Digest ; Sept. 5, f 14, pp. 404-405.
3. The Independent; Aug. 31, »14, p. 316; Also , The Outlook
(Feb. 3, '15). In reviewing the action of the president in
this case, said, "As to loans from financiers in this country
to belligerents, the government has no right to prevent such
loans, but in one case at least, the President by expressing
his wish, has exerted his influence against a proposed loan
and it was not carried into effect.

19
Great Britain and France early incurred obligations of this
nature
amounting to .$60,000,000; Russia procured a debt for $35,000,000
and France a separate credit of $36,000,000. On March 36, 1915,
Count Bernstorff signed a contract with New York bankers whereby
the German Imperial Government received |10,000,000 in credit.
It was understood that there would be no payment of funds into the
German Treasury. The notes were to be delivered directly in this
country and the proceeds to be used as a credit for the German
Government in the purchase of various articles, or in payment of
obligations contracted before the war. Likewise, on March 39,
1915, the French Government established an additional |50,000,000
credit loan through the J. P. Morgan syndicate. Thus before March
31, the available statistics showed the French had established
$76,000,000 in credit in the United States. It is probable that
there had been other French loans established with individual
banking institutions against shipments of certain commodities which
would make the grand total $100,000,000.
The largest single loan of the year, however, was the
Anglo-French Loan of $500,000,000 made in September. The announce
ment in the newspapers of Sept. 38 gave the terms: A bond issue
of $500,000,000 to be floated, drawing 5$ interest and issued to
the syndicate at 96; the money to remain in the United States
and to be used only in payment for commodities.
One of the rabid pro German papers, 4 in speaking of this
loan, said, there were two interests at work; the one of the
Morgan group, holding that the money should be paid towards
4. The Continental Time3
,
Sept. 33, 1915.

20
liquidating the heavy debt due for munitions in America;
the
second, that of the grain and meat dealers who wanted
the money
held for payment of provisions. It continued, "Anyhow,
in no
case, will any of the cash advanced he permitted to leave
the
country." The daily papers in speaking of the attitude
of the
United States Government, said the loan was regarded by high
offici-
als as a commercial credit, not differing from other
commercial
transactions in war supplies, which are permitted under
domestic
and international law,
While no belligerent government has protested to the
United States Government against allowing American bankers to
make
war loans, there have been some protests on the part of
German-
Americans- who threatened to withdraw their deposits from any
bank
taking part in any English or French loan. Such protests
however
were local and of no great consequence.
The statistical data cited above, which is by no means
exhaustive, will be sufficient to give some idea of the vast scale
on which the belligerent nations have borrowed in the United States.
But it is significant that they have all been credit loans.
The
question arises how are we to reconcile the action of the administra
tion in allowing war loans to be floated in this country after hav-
ing earlier disapproved them. We are first confronted with the
proposition that it might be no breach of neutrality to change
the policy; and such is quite generally conceded to be the case.
Going back still further, it would be well to observe
just how much the policy has changed. In the early part of the
war before any loans were made, the government flatly disapproved
of such loans being made and has never, as yet approved it.

Referring again to Secretary Bryan's statement in regard to the
establishment of credits in the United States, "The Government has
not felt it was justified in interposing objections to the credit
arrangements which have been brought to its attention. It has
neither approved nor disapproved - it has simply taken no action
in the premises." It would hardly be fair to say that the
government has weakly acquiesced in, or bowed down to, the inevit-
able. Two things should be noted: First, it was a proposed loan
which would have taken $50,000,000 worth of gold from the United
States which President Wilson disapproved - all loans which have
actually been made are as cited above credits, secured by notes,
which are to be expended in the United States for supplies.
Secondly,, at the time of the first proposed loan, Americans owed
large sums abroad and were adopting various plans for meeting
the debt. International trade was partly paralyzed. Now the
debt has been shifted to the other side. And, if we strive to
promote the safe transportation of supplies which belligerents
are permitted to buy here, we may reasonably promote payment for
these supplies. The credit loans were negotiated that payments
might be made.
This argument is based upon national rather than inter-
national considerations, which brings up the fact that the matter
of loans is regulated by municipal, rather than by international
law. The Hague Convention number V, Article 18 of 1907 stipulates
that the making to one of the belligerents of a loan by a neutral
person shall not be considered a hostile act.
5
5. Higgins, Peace Conferences: p, 386.

32
This is cited, not because it is now in force, but because it
suras up the laws and practices of nations at the present time bet-
ter than any other single statement. The interpretation is, that
since a neutral person is not prohibited from making loans, he is
left to his own judgment and to such regulations as his own
government may see fit to impose upon him. The action of the
United States Government at first, therefore, not only accorded
with the needs of the country, as cited above, but also with
advanced ideas of international morality and American disfavor of
war. 6
It has been shown that owing to the vast proportions of
the war and its long duration, the business depression as a con-
sequent result, were credit loans not available, would have a
ruinous effect on American industry. But it will not be necessary
to go into details. The theme does not depend upon this point
alone for its establishment; it is mentioned incidentally to
show that the acquiesence of the government, under the greatly
changed conditions, in permitting credit loans may be as praise-
worthy as the earlier disapproval.
No nation lives to itself alone; no one nation can
stop a war, in which half the population of the world is involved.
Whatever our ideas for peace and how ever much we may desire to
6. "The decision of the United States Government opposing loans
by American bankers to nations at war is heartily to be ap-
proved of. It does not hanger over the matter whether or
not the laws of nations will allow such loans. This decision
by our government is proof of a real desire to put an end to
war, without regard to our own interests; it would be our
own present interest to make loans to both belligerents but
we lend to neither, thereby keeping clear from complications
and helping the cause of peace." ( Independent ) Aug. 24,1914)
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do nothing which would in any way aid in carrying on the struggle,
we are forced to admit, it would be a poorly conceived policy which
would cause any unnecessary suffering without something definite by
way of return.
The fact that no government has protested to the United
States might toe expected because it would seem rather inconsistent
for one belligerent which had established a loan in this country,
to argue that it is a breach of neutrality for the same govern-
ment to allow another belligerent to float a loan in its country.
There was however an investigation in connection with
the Federal Reserve Banks accepting the notes of the belligerent
nations which had been given in payment for arms and munitions.
Dr. Jastrow'' argued that the acceptance and indorsement of such
notes, by Federal Reserve Banks in the United States constituted
a violation of neutrality, inasmuch as such notes are legal obliga-
tions of the United States government. It was pointed out that
Federal Reserve Banks are private institutions, and that their
operations are privately directed, subject only to general super-
vision analogous to the supervision of all banks,
8
Professor Jastrow seemed to think that notes given in pay-
ment for exported arms, become an obligation of the United States,
?. Professor of Politics in the University of Berlin.
8. Professor Jastrow, it is suggested, might have been misled
by the language in the act reading, "the said notes, (Federal
reserve notes,) shall be obligations of the United States and
shall be receivable" at such and such institutions. This is
simply the kind of language that is used of all American
money, and if the use of Federal reserve notes in this connection
compromised the Government, the same thing would be true of
purchases effected by national bank notes, United States notes,
Treasury notes, gold and silver certificates and the like.
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when rediscounted at the Federal Reserve Bank. The Federal Re-
serve act makes it plain that such is not the case. Such notes
must be indorsed by at least one bank - a private institution
-
and to the extent of that indorsement is, of course an obligation
of the member bank, which might be a regular national bank or a
state institution. All obligations arising from such a trans-
action would lie against the signers and indorsers of the notes
to reimburse the Federal Reserve Bank.
In only one case would such notes become obligations, in
any sense, of the Federal Reserve bank, though even then it must
be kept in mind that the Federal Reserve Bank is a privately owned
institution. Such a case would arise if the Federal Reserve Bank
should tender the ammunition notes in question to the Federal
reserve agent as a basis for the issue of Federal reserve notes.
If the paper, arising from sales of ammunition should depreciate
in value, the Federal Reserve Board might call on the Federal
Reserve Bank for additional security to protect the Federal
reserve notes, and that would be the extent of its obligation.
Even this condition would arise rarely. Most Federal Reserve
banks do their rediscount ing of commercial paper with ordinary
money. But, even if Federal Reserve notes should be used for
rediscounting notes in payment for ammunition, no obligation of
the United States would in any sense be created.
Sometime later, former Representative Fowler charged
that the Reserve banks were violating American neutrality by ad-
vancing money to buy arms for the entente allies. But the charge
was dismissed, the board holding that it was without jurisdiction
in the case or without power to impose the regulations and restric-
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tions which Mr. Fowler requested, upon either Federal Reserve
Banks or National Banks.
Concerning the charge of unfairness on the part of.Govern-
ment in early disapproving of war loans and permitting trade in
contraband, Mr. Bryant summed up the reasons President Wilson con-
sidered war loans to be inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality
and he went on to show wherein the making of war loans differs
from trading in contraband: "The policy of disapproving of war
loans effects all nations alike, so that the disapproval is not
an unneutral act. The case is entirely different in the matter
of arms and ammunition, because prohibition of exports not only
might not, but in this case, would not operate equally upon the
nations at war,
"Then too, the reason given for the disapproval of war
loans is supported by other considerations which are absent in
the case presented by the 3ale of arms and ammunition. The taking
of money out of the United States during such a war as this might
seriously embarass the government in case it needed to borrow
money. Again a war loan, if offered for popular subscription in
the United States, would be taken up chiefly by those who are in
sympathy with the belligerent seeking the loan." The result of
this would be to arouse more partisan feeling on the part of great
numbers of American people. "On the other handy said Mr. Bryan,
"contracts for and sales of contraband are mere matters of trade.
The manufacturer, unless peculiarly sentimental, would sell to
one belligerent as readily as he would to another. No general
spirit of partisanship is aroused, no sympathies excited.
9. Letter to Senator Stone, in European War, No, 2, pp. 58 - 63.
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The whole transaction is merely a matter of business." The reasons
were therefore based upon national expediency, rather than inter-
national considerations*
In fact, in replying to the charge of inconsistency and
breach of neutrality on the part of the United States in allowing
American citizens to make loans to belligerent nations, Secretary
Lansing iC) took the position that no violation of domestic or
international law is involved in the flotation of big loans in
this country. He explained that the administration voiced its
objection chiefly to loans by popular subscription or those which
wculd take large sums of gold from the United States. He 3aid,
so far as the State Department officials were able to observe, the
loans were essentially what is known as 'credit loans' to pay
for obligations incurred or about to be incurred for the purchase
of supplies. Such a loan is viewed as a private commercial
transaction, not differing from the traffic in contraband or other
war supplies, over which a neutral government is not obliged to
exercise any control.
Mr. Lansing based his argument that there is no legal
obstacle to loans being made by bankers in this country upon the
practice of nations, and especially of the United States. It is
true the United States refused a loan of money to France in 1798,
and one to Buenos Ayres in 1816, 11 both on the grounds cf neutral-
ity. These loans were considered a violation of neutrality large-
ly because they partook of a national character, being negotiated
by the envoys of the United States. The authorities are practical
ly all agreed that loans of money may not be made or guaranteed by
10. Sept. 15, 1915.
11. Moore, Digest VII, p. 978: In the case of Buenos Ayres, the
American agent, Col. Devereus, offered his services to pro-
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a neutral state. 12
During the early nineteenth century and preceeding, how-
ever, subjects of neutral countries were more reluctant in making
loans than they were later. This may "be due to the fact that
there is agreater necessity for war loans being floated in neutral
countries than has ever been the case in the past,
A few examples of loans showing the practice in some of
the later wars may be cited; In 1854, during the Crimean war
France protested in vain against a Russian loan being brought out
in Amsterdam, Berlin, and Hamburg, In 1870, during the Franco-
German war, a French loan and also a North German Confederation
Loan 15 was brought out in London. In 1877, during the Russo-
Turkish war, Japanese loans were floated in London and Berlin,
and Russian loans in Paris and Berlin.
I
4 Large Japanese loans
were also floated in the United States.
No further evidence need be given to show the tendency
in the practice of nations, regarding war loans. Professor
Reinsch, says on this point, "Response to public sentiment might
lead some neutral governments as a matter of public policy, to
forbid the public advertisement and issue of war loans, but it must
be noted that the credit of a nation may be looked upon as a
national asset, which ought to be available to it in times of need.
^
cure a loan in the United States under the guarantee of the
United States Government. It was sanctioned by the Congress
at Tucuman but was disavowed by the United States Government.
13. Wilson & Tucker, International Law, 5 Ed, p. 305.
13. Moore, Digest VII, p. 975; also Westlake, International Law;
Vol. II, pp. 317-18.
14. Oppenheim, International Law, II; p. 381.
15. Hershey, International Law as applied during the Russo-
Japanese War; p. 81.
16. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law,
1908; pp. 84-85.

Without going into the moral and economic aspects of the
case, let us consider the opinions of the writers on international
law. As is usually the case on a question of international law
the authorities are not in agreement; the earlier writers quite
generally, and some of the late writers maintain that belligerent
loans should not be contracted by neutrals, either nations or
individuals. 17 Halleckib cites Vattell9 as contending that the
loaning of money to one of the belligerents, by the subjects of a
neutral state is not such a breach of neutrality as to be either
a cause of war or of complaint, provided the loan is made for the
purpose of getting good interest and not for the purpose of enabl-
ing one belligerent to attack the other. He says, "Phillimore20
very properly regards this as a manifest frittering away of the
important duties to furnish the one as the other of the 'two main
nerves, iron and gold; for theequippage and conduct of war. 21
The United States Supreme Court held in the case of
17. This extreme view is advocated by such writers as Bluntschli
(Volkerrecht
,
Sec. 768) and Calvo ( Le Droit International,
Sec. 1060.
18. Halleck, International Law, (4 ed, by Baker) II, pp. 185-186.
19. Droit des Gens, III, Chapt. II, Sec. 15.
20. On International Law III, Sec. 151.
31. Halleck cites the case of Demetrius DeWut z v. Hendricks 1824.
as does also Phillimore (III. p. 274 of Int. Law, 3 ed, 1885).
In this case the court held, "The principles which have been
laid down prohibit the neutral government from assisting a
belligerent by money, in the shape of a loan, or in any other
form as much as by arms; and it has been held unlawful by
English law for an English subject to raise a loan for the
purpose of supporting the subjects of a foreign state at war
with a government in alliance with our own. " It has been pomt
ed out that the connection of alliance was the basis of this
decision; Moore (Digest , VIII
, p. 976) says, in 1833 the law of-
ficers of the crown advised the British government that sub-
scriptions by individuals of a neutral nation were inconsist-
ent with neutrality and contrary to the law of nations; but
that "loans if entered into merely with commercial views"
would not be an infringement of neutrality.
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Kennet vs. Chambers^ that a 'suit cannot be maintained on a loan
made expressly to effect a belligerent object or to aid in an in-
surrection in a foreign state against a government at peace with
the state of the lender. 1 Professor Moore remarks that this loan
was made to effect not merely a belligerent object 1 but an actual
violation of the neutrality laws of the United States. Whatever
may have been the law at that time, Taylor says, 23 "Usage had en-
tirely discredited those publicists who have attempted to give an
unreasonable and impracticable extension to the rule that neutral
individuals may lend money to belligerent states, by denying
directly, or by implication, to individuals composing a neutral
community the excercise of a right withheld for obvious reasons
from the state as such.
"
Hall24 takes somewhat the same view - thus he says, "It
is difficult to understand why modern writers repudiate analogy
and custom by condemning the negotiation of a loan by neutral sub-
jects under ordinary mercantile conditions. "25 He continues,
"Outside the boards of works on International law, a healthier
rule is unquestioned. A modern belligerent no more dreams of com-
plaining because the markets of a neutral nation are open to his
enemy for the purchase of money, than because they are open for
the purchase of cotton." The reason this is so, he explains, is
22. Moore, Digest VIII, p. 978.
23. Taylor, International Public Law, 1901; p. 673.
24. Hall, Int. Law, ( 6 ed. ) ; pp. 590 - 591.
25. Hall cites Bluntechli, (Sec. 768) as saying the neutral state
must abstain from making loans for purposes of war, and the
rule is equally applicable to loans negotiated by private
persons. He also mentions the fact that Wheaton, Manning,
DeMartens, Kluber, Heffter, and Twiss make no mention of loans
whether by the soverign or by subjects. Wharton (Int. Law
Digest, III, p. 508) says, "The lending of money by persons
_
in neutral countries to a belligerent government is not a vio-
lation of neutrality. It is remarkable that a contrary view
should be taken.
"
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that^irr*theory and in fact an article of commerce in the fullest
sense of the word. To throw upon neutral governments the obliga-
tion of controlling dealings in it would be to set up a solitary
exception to the fundamental rule that states are not responsible
for the commercial acts of their subjects. The existence of such
an exception would burden states with a responsibility which they
would be wholly unable to meet.
The present day theory, which is comformable to the general
practice of nations is that money is, and should be treated as
contraband. Thus Oppenheira says, 26 "Several writers maintain
either that a neutral is obliged to prevent such loans and subsidies
altogether, or at least that he must prohibit a public subscription
on neutral territory, for such loans and subsidies. On the other
hand the number of writers is constantly increasing who maintain
that, since money is just as much an article of commerce as good3,
a neutral is in no wise obliged to prevent on his territory public
subscriptions on the part of his subjects for loans to the belli-
gerents. In contradistinction to the theory of International Law,
the practice of the states has beyond doubt established the fact
that neutrals need not prevent the subscription for loans to belli-
gerents on their territory."
In the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. Diekelman2 ?
Chief Justice Waite said, "What is contraband depends upon circum-
stances. Money and bullion do not necessarily partake of that
character; but when destined for hostile use, or to procure hostile
supplies, they do." Lawrence says, 2k "Money is a form of raerchan-
26. International Law, II, 1906; pp. 380 - 81.
27. Atherly-Jones, Commerce in War, 1907; p. 82.
28. Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 4 ed. p. 631
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dise, and neutral subjects may trade in it; though if they send
to one belligerent specie or negotiable securities, the crusiers
of the other may capture them on their voyage as being contraband
of war. But neutral governments are in no way bound to prevent
their subjects from taking stock in loans issued by belligerents."
He adds that no war of any magnitude runs its course without a
resort to neutral money markets.
Westlake 29 analyses the situation as follows, "Since
money is truly described as the sinews of war, and it is no part
of the business of a state to deal in money, its loan by a neutral
state to a belligerent would necessarily have a special character,
not only as aiding the latter in fact but also as disclosing an
intent by an unneutral act. Tried by tests which have been sug-
gested as imposed by the theory of neutrality loans by neutral
individuals to belligerent states must be pronounced legitimate,
and such they are in fact held to be. n
The authorities are practically agreed that loans of money
to belligerent states may not be made or guaranteed by a neutral
state as such, 20 Thus it is argued by some that the United
States had become involved in a breach of neutrality, through the
agency of the Federal Reserve Banks in some of the war loans. It
has been already shown that the working of the act creating Federal
Reserve Banks indicates that they are no more under the control of
the government, by way of obligations to it, than national oanks.
The question as to gifts, subscriptions, and subsidies
need not detain us here because they have never been an issue in
29. Westlake, International Law, 1907; vol. II, pp. 307-318.
30. See Wilson & Tucker, International Law, 5 Ed. p. 305; also
Hall, International Law, 6 ed; p. 590.

32
the present war. In fact, in all cases, with the possible ex-
ception of the Federal Reserve notes, it has been clear to all
parties concerned that the loans floated in this country were made
by private individuals and were of a strictly commercial nature.
Therefore, it would appear from the weight of evidence based upon
the practice of nations and modern theory that the United States
has been quite within the bounds of neutrality as to both the
rights and duties of a neutral in permitting American citizens to
advance war loans to the belligerents.
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Chapter IV.
THE SALE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS OF WAR TO. THE BELLIGERENTS.
With respect to the sale of arms and munitions of war by
American citizens the policy of the United States Government has
been well defined and consistent from the beginning of the war.
From the announcement by President V/ilson in his Neutrality
Procl amation until the present time the government has made no
attempt to interfere with American citizens in their lawful traf-
fic 1 in the munitions of war. There has been a great deal of
opposition to this policy of the government; an opposition which
has manifested itself not only through the governments of the
Central Powers, but also in the Congress and the press of this
country.
The complaints have been to the effect that it is unneutral
for the United States Government to allow the trade as it is being
carried on in the present war. The belligerents have not denied
the general right of neutral individuals to sell munitions to
1. The circular issued by the State Department October 15, 1914
pertaining to Neutrality and Trade in Contraband 1 called at-
tention to the fact that American citizens were not allowed
to fit out or supply vessels in American ports, or military
expeditions on American soil in aid of a belligerent. These
are prohibited by the Neutrality Laws of the United States and
by the laws of nations. It was expressly stated that all
other contraband trade is legal; neither the laws of the
United States nor of the nations prohibit it. (Amer. Jour,
of International Law, Supp; Jan. 1915, pp. 124-126)
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belligerents, 2 "but their complaints have been to the effect that
under the peculiar conditions in the present war, the situation
is so affected as to make the trade unneutral. The special
circumstances, as gathered from the several diplomatic dispatches
may be roughly summed up in four groups. First, the great ex-
tent of the trade; Secondly, there is only one nation furnishing
munitions; Third, the munitions industry has been built up in
America as a result of the war; and finally, and perhaps the
greatest element of all, one side only in the conflict can procure
the supplies. These special circumstances will be considered as
they are found to exist in the war; but it will be well first
to note the opinions of international authorities on the question
of the right of neutral individuals to sell contraband to belli-
gerent nations. We may observe by this means whether or not the
great number of men who have written on international law, and
who are largely responsible for the codification of it, antici-
pated that many special circumstances might arise which would
make the rules which they observed to exist non-effective. At
any rate we will have established the American position, as it
is based upon the law and practice of the past.
First, considering the American writers, an examination
of all the important writers of the United States reveals the fact
that with the exception of ., Field3 and Woolsey4 all have taken
the view in regard to the sale of munitions as was expressed by
Thomas Jefferson in 1793. Mr, Jefferson was Secretary of State
2. In a note of Feb. 16, 1915 the German Government formally ad-
mitted the right of neutral individuals to sell arms and muni-
tions to belligerents in ordinary circumstances. Ibid, July
1915; pp. 90-96.
3. Outlines of an International Law Code, Sec. 964.
4. International Law, P. 330, Note 1.

at this time when complaint was made by the British Government
that American citizens were selling munitions of war to the French
Government, which was then Great Britain's enemy. The reply
which he sent to the American Minister at London was to the effect
that n Our citizens have always been free to vend and export arms;
it is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them; to
suppress their callings, the only means of their subsistence be-
cause a war exists in foreign and distant countries in which we
have no concern would scarcely be expected; it would be hard in
principle and impossible in practice. "5
With the exception of Phillimore the British writers are
unanimous in this view. Phillimore takes the view that it is
the duty 'of a neutral to abstain from every act which may make
better or worse the condition of a belligerent, 6 rather than the
common view that it is the right of neutrals to carry on their ac-
customed trade upon the breaking out of a war.''' Phillimore
makes no distinction between neutral nations and neutral individu-
als, a distinction which nearly all the later writers make,
French jurists are likewise generally agreed that a neutral nat-
ion is under no obligation to restrain its subjects from selling
munitions of war to belligerents. fe
Since the Germans have complained most in regard to the
American policy it will be especially significant to observe the
opinions of German authorities on international law. Perels,
5. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. VII, p. 955.
6. International Law, Vol. Ill, Sec. 330.
7. Opinion of Lord Stowell in the case of the Immanuel
,
(3 Rob. p. 198)
8. Prof. Garner, Some Questions of International Law, during the
European War, in the American Journal of International Law,
July 1916,
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in referring to the question as to whether a neutral state is
obliged to prevent its subjects from furnishing war materials to
belligerents says: "It cannot be doubted in fact that unless
there is a notorious favor shown towards one of the belligerents,
there is no obligation to forbid the assistance,
Geffcken, after a somewhat lengthy discussion of trade in
contraband came to the conclusion that it was no violation of
their duties as neutrals if states allowed their subjects to sell
and export munitions of war to belligerents. Professor von Bar
argued very effectively that the prohibition of contraband trade
by neutrals would injure incalculably not only the commerce of
neutrals but even their manufacturing industry, and in a large
measure the product of their agriculture, forests, and mines.
He maintains that what a belligerent may demand is only that the
relations between a neutral and his adversary shall remain as they
were before the war. 10 Herr Kriege expressed the official German
view in regard to ia-oolislhirig contraband, when he said, "neutral
states are not bound to prevent their subjects from engaging in
a commerce which from the point of view of belligerents must be
considered as illicit. 11 Moreover the German Government ratified
Convention V which was drawn up at this conference, Article 7 of
which reads, "A neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the
9. Manuel de Droit Maritime International, p. 270.
10. Observations sur'le Oontrabande de Guerre, in the Revue, de.
Droit International, Vol. 36, 1894, pp. 401 - 407. For an ex-
tensive list of German authorities in agreement with these
see Garner, Some Questions of int. Law, in The American Jour-
nal of International Law, July, 1916.
Acts et Documents
.
Vol. Ill, p. 859.
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export cr transport on behalf of one or other of the belligerent
arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be
of use to an army or fleet."
While this convention is not technically in force in the
present war, yet, it affords a concise and authoritative statement
of the acknowledged rule of law. That it is in accord with the
German theory is evident from the foregoing citations of German
writers. That it is in accord with German, as well as French,
English, American, and Austrian practice will be seen in the
course of this paper. We will endeavor to compare the actions of
other governments in previous wars in which situations somewhat
analogous to the 'special circumstances* in the present war have
arisen.
We will first consider the extent of the munitions trade
by American citizens. Never before in the history of the country
has there been such a great traffic in firearms, explosives, and
the materials used in their manufacture. We can get only a vague
idea as to the volume of the munitions trade from the number of
dollars worth exported from this country. The figures are, at
best only approximations. Then, too, much of the so-called muni-
tions is food-stuffs, clothing, and such material as will be used
by the civil population. It is equally true that a vast quantity
of merchandise shipped from the United States ostensibly for the
civil population will find its way into the armies. Regardless
of these sources of error, many shipments leave American ports,
with the port authorities ignorant as to their intended use. It
is not required by the Government that the officials at the ports
should find whether the goods being shipped are what they purport
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to be, much less that they should ascertain the purpose for which
they will be used.-^
The vast extent of this trade is best appreciated when
reckoned on the basis of nations requiring outside supplies on
the one hand, and the number of markets open on the other hand,
in the present war there are ten belligerent nations dependent
in part at least for outside supplies, and the United States is
the only market open to them for munitions. The proportion of
nations selling to those buying is therefore one to ten. On the
same basis, it is doubtful if there ever was a greater ratio in
any previous war than three to five. The fact that the ten
combatant nations include the largest in the world; and they
supporting the largest armies in their history would have a ten-
dency to make the given ratios mean as much as they indicate.
So great has been the demand for munitions in this country that
in order to meet it, companies engaged in the manufacture of
articles ranging in variety from clocks to locomotives have con-
verted their shops into munitions factories, and those originally
engaged in the manufacture of fire-arms and explosives have in-
creased their output by doubling and trebling their plants and by
working three shifts of men instead of one. In some instances
flourishing cities have been built up from small towns by the
location of factories for the manufacture of explosives.
12. Mr. Frank R. Rutter, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce commented in regard to this. He said,
"The impossibility of distinguishing accurately between muni-
tions of war and commercial nhipments must be clearly recog-
nized. It is not practicable to ask our exporters to declare
whether each individual shipment is destined for the supply of
armies or for commercial use. Many shippers are undoubtedly
uninformed and, in any event, such a requirement would meet
vigorous opposition. Yet in no other way can commercial ship-
ments be distinguieshed, even in a general way.
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These figures by themselves are apt to be misleading,
we grant that neutrality is dependent upon the magnitude of the
supply of munitions which neutral individuals may furnish, it is
quite evident that the limit could not be based upon a certain
fixed amount as determined by quantity or value alone. In other
words there must be a proportion between the magnitude of the war
and the supplies. It is only reasonable that more supplies of
munitions will be required in a war involving thirteen nations,
including the leading military nations of the world than in a war,
as for example between two South American nations, or in fact, in
any of the wars of the past. If the supplies furnished by the
neutrals in past wars have been relatively small, it does not
follow that the neutral must, in order to be consistent with
the practice of the past, furnish no larger supplies in the pres-
ent world war. It has been stated by the British Minister of
Munitions that less ammunition was used by the British forces
during the entire Boer War than was consumed in one battle during
the present war.
"It follows naturally that in the cases of world-wide wars
like the present conflict," says Professor Garner, "the recourse
to neutral markets will be larger, and it is impossible to fix a
point beyond which permission to resort to those markets ceases
to be consistent with neutrality, if recourse in any degree is
to be recognized as lawful. To hold that it is not unneutral
for a state to permit its subjects to sell arms and munitions to
belligerents so long as the magnitude of the war is not such as
to create a demand for large quantities of such supplies, but that
it becomes unneutral when by reason of the widespread character
of the war the resulting demand assumes large proportions, is
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again to introduce quantitative distinctions in the place of dis-
tinctions founded on juridical principle, "I3 Furthermore, there
is no evidence to show that any country has ever restricted
14
the trade of its nationals in munitions of war to belligerents
lest the trade become so great that its neutrality should become
involved thereby. 15
The international jurists have not been unanimously agreed
on this point in the past, although it is safe to say that all
recent writers on international law maintain that trade of neutrals
with belligerents should not be impeded, 10 except by the policf
powers of the enemy belligerent. foolsey, Field, Phillimore,
Hautefeuille, Kleen, Gessner, and Bluntechli argue that a neutral
state should place some restrictions upon its citizens in time of
war, especially upon contraband trade. But the majority of writ-
ers deny that 3uch should be the case. They point out that such
practice has not been followed in the past. Examination of all
the later writers shows that they, without regard to nationality
uphold the doctrine that neutral trade in contraband should be
unrestricted. They point out that it is impossible to draw a
line between those amounts which constitute small and large trade
in contraband. There is no sense in laying down a rule of law
13. Questions of international Law, Amer. Jour, of Int. Law, July,.
1916 «
14. There are, of course, instances in which embargoes have been
laid, thereby cutting off all trade in certain articles, but
no country has ever allowed a trade to exist and then attempt-
ed to limit it by setting an arbitrary boundary. See Spaight
War Rights on lifted; pp. 478-478.
15. Lawrence, Principles of international Law; pp. 697-700.
16. Holland, Studies in International Law; p. 121; "The presump-
tion of relations between belligerents and neutrals is in
favor of neutrals being entitled to carry on their trade, or
otherwise pursue their ordinary avocations, as if the war to
which they are no parties, were not being waged."
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which would be dependent upon a practical impossibility. ±
Such a rule would be very difficult to enforce; it would
entail all the difficulties incident to the enforcement of a total
restriction.^ Furthermore with due consideration for the large
number of nations the American merchants are now furnishing muni-
tions, it may be doubted if the proportion of American made muni-
tions is any larger relatively than German made munitions in any
of the recent wars; the Spanish-American, the Russo-Japanese,
the Balkan, or the Turko-Italian. For, notwithstanding the
enormous quantities being shipped from this country, the arsenals
17. Lawrence, Principles of International Law; pp. 669-702.
Some writers who desire to place as many restrictions as
possible upon trade in contraband, have drawn a distinction
between large and small commercial transactions. The latter
they regard as a continuation of such ordinary trade as may_
have existed before the war, whereas the former are called in-
to existence by the war and connot be considered in any sense
a prolongation of the previous operations of neutral merchants
If these statements are to be regarded as an expression of ex-
isting law, it is sufficient, to say that the rule they advocat
has never been adopted. I^on the other hand, they are held
to set forth what the law ought to be, we may remark that
the difficulty of drawing a line between a small trade and a
large one, is so great as to amount to an impossibility.
Moreover, it is by no means certain that international trade
in arms on a large scale is confined to times of war. A firm
like Krupp of Essen makes artillery for half the armies of the
civilized world during periods of profound peace, and lastly
it may be argued that the burden placed by the proposed rule
upon neutral governments would be too great for them to bear.
The stoppage of large shipments of arms for belligerent pur-
poses from the ports of a great country would require for its
effective enforcement an army of spies and informers.
18. Davis, Elements of International Law; p. 403, shows that by
virtue of the internal administration of different countries,
some could effectively regulate or prohibit contraband trade
on the part of their subjects, if it should become desirable
to do so; whereas in England and America, "where no such
supervision exists in time of peace, it could be established
in time of war only by special legislation, and could be main-
tained only at considerable expense and at the risk of violat-
ing some of the existing guarantees of individual rights."

of the belligerent countries are working over time, and very many
other industries have been turned into the manufacture of munitions,
The exceptionally large armies, stretching along battle fronts of
hundreds of miles, and the continuous firing day after day for
months at a time have created demands for arms and ammunition here-
tofore unknown in the history of the world. All of this goes to
show that while the amounts from thi3 country are exceptionally
large from our view point they are after all small in comparison
with the total amounts used. It might be therefore contended
that the trade has not yet reached such proportions as would
justify complaint, assuming as the standard, the complaints of
governments made in former wars. 12
The contention put forward by the German and Austro- Hun-
garian Governments that the conception of neutrality has been
given a new aspect by the fact that in the present war the markets
of but a single state have become the chief, if not the sole, source
of foreign supply for the belligerents, cannot be admitted as
sound. SO If the argument were sound, it might be turned to a
defense of the American position. In the absence of legal princi-
ple upon which to base the argument it might be maintained that
neutrals are allowed to furnish a certain proportion of the total
amount of munitions required for the war. So long as the amount
furnished does not exceed the given proportion, the question of
neutrality does not arise. Whether the munitions come from several
different nations or from one, makes no difference; this will be
19, For a list of such complaints see Garner, Op. cit., also Moore,
Digest, Vol. VII, pp. 957 - 958.
20. Questions of Int. Law, Amer. Jour, of Int. Law, July, 1916.
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determined 30lely by economic laws. This argument is more
plausible than the other alternative, namely that traffic in arras
and munitions is legitimate, so long as the markets of other
neutral powers are open to belligerents , but that it cease$ to be
consistent with the spirit of neutrality the moment the number of
such states is reduced to one. Such argument virtually denies
that one nation may allow its citizens to trade in contraband
although all or several nations may allow their citizens to do so.
There are no other instances on record in which during a
war there has been only one nation furnishing munitions, so we
can cite no practice; but it is submitted that none of the text
writers have laid down any principles which might be so construed
as to mate the furnishing of munitions by one nation alone a
breach of neutrality.
The third special circumstance which has been put forward
as affecting the status of neutrality in the present case is
that traffic in munitions in the United States is a new industry,
one which has sprung up as a result of the war, and is therefore
unneutral. In a memorandum of April 4, 1915, Count Bernstorff
said, "In contradiction with the real spirit of neutrality, an
enormous new industry in war materials of every kind is being built
up in the United States. Not only the existing plants are kept
busy and enlarged, but also new ones are continually founded."
International agreements for the protection of rights of neutrals,
he continued, originate in the necessity of protecting existing
industries of the neutral countries and were never intended to en-
courage the creation of entirely new industries in neutral states?!
21. Amer. Journal of International Law, Supp. ; Vol, LX, July, 1915,
pp. 125-26.

The government of the United States pointed out that such
a principle is unfounded in international practice. There are
no instances of a government being required to interfere with
the development of new industries by its citizens whether in time
of war or peace. If the munitions industry is new in the United
States, it came into existence to supply a demand. There is no
principle in the international code which could be interpreted
as making this a breach of neutrality, nor is there any likelihood
that such an agreement will be reached in the future because such
a rule would tend to direct the trade in munitions to those coun-
tries which had well developed munitions works at the time such
a rule would go into effect.
The three claims just considered are based upon the assump-
tion, which is contrary to the generally accepted view as cited
earlier, that a neutral nation is bound to exercise some control
over the business affairs of its subjects as a means of remaining
neutral. The merits of the special circumstances do not seem to
warrant such a departure from the established rule. The fourth
complaint is based upon the fact that one of the belligerents is
cut off from the supply. This principle virtually denies the
right of neutral individuals to trade in munitions with any of
the belligerents to any extent when one is cut off from the supply.
The Germans maintain it is not sufficient that the neutral be will-
ing to furnish munitions to all the belligerents alike, but it
must do it, otherwise the neutral is not treating the belligerents
impartially, and is therefore not neutral. "Without digressing
further at this point to cite the theory and law governing this
"special circumstance 11 we may point out that the practice of

Germany and Austria-Hungary during the Boer War was the same as
that of the United States is now. 22 The records show that both
Germany and Austria sold munitions in great quantities to the
British during this war when the Boers were effectually cut off
from all outside supplies. 23 If the supplies were smaller amounts
it was due to no restrictions by the German or Austrian govern-
ments. The trade was regulated by the natural law of supply and
demand just as the American trade in the present war.
Germany has maintained that in order to remain neutral
under the existing circumstances the United States must prohibit
all munitions leaving this country. Since impartial . treat-
ment is the essential feature of neutrality, and the test is one
of fact and not of theory, it becomes evident under the special
circumstances, in which Germany and Austria find themselves unable
to procure supplies from American ports, that the United States
government must either restrict the British in their sea opera-
22. Spaight, War Rights on Land, p. 478. Also an Article by Dr.
C. N. Gregor y, Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Scienc e, July, 1915, pp. 190-191.
23, Secretary Lansing to the Austro-Hungarian Government, Aug. 12 ,
1915: "During the war between Great Britain and the South
African Republics, the patrol of the coasts of neighboring
neutral colonies by British Naval vessels prevented arms and
ammunition reaching the Transvaal or the Orange Free State.
The allied republics were in a situation almost identical in
that respect with that in which Austria-Hungary and Germany
find themselves at the present time. Yet, in spite of the
commercial isolation of one belligerent Germany sold to Great
Britain, the other belligerent, hundreds of thousands of kilos
of explosives, gunpowder, cartridges, shot, and weapons; and
it is known that Austria-Hungary also sold similar munitions
to the same purchaser, though in smaller quantities.
"While, as compared with the present war, the quantities
sold were small the principle of neutrality involved was the
same. If at that time Austria-Hungary and her present ally
had refused to sell arms and ammunition to Great Britain on
the ground that to do so would violate the spirit of strict
neutrality, the Imperial and Royal Government might with
greater consistency and greater force urge its present conten-
tion."
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tions, so supplies can reach Germany, or else the United States
must refuse to allow any munitions to leave this country. The
fallacy of this position lies in the fact that a neutral is not
required to furnish supplies in equal amounts to each of the
belligerents. The requirements of impartiality are satisfied
by his keeping the markets open to all buyers without discrimina-
tion. This being done, the neutral has no right, much less
obligation, to announce that under no circumstances will it be
permitted any of the belligerents to cut the other off from the
supply. Such a restriction would be unjustified in warfare:, in
order to make it effective, as in the present case, the neutral
would practically be taking part in the conflict.
Such a restriction would be contrary to the theory so
unanimously maintained by the leading writers of the world. The
prevailing theory is based upon sound practical considerations.
As has been well expressed by Chancellor Kent in Seton v. Low : 24
n A neutral nation has nothing to do with the war, and is under no
moral obligation to abandon or abridge its trade; and yet at the
same time from the law of necessity, the powers at war have the
right to seize and confiscate the contraband goods, and this
they do from the principles of self-defence,"
The authorities on international law are agreed that un-
less for certain reasons of national policy, trade with belliger-
ents should be restricted that there is no justification for any
interference on the part of neutral governments with the trade of
24. New York Supreme Court; 1799 in Snow, International Law;
Naval War College, 2 Ed, p. 135, 1898; Also Hall, Treatise
on International Law, 4 Ed. p. 84.
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their citizens. Restrictions upon the rights of trade enjoyed
by peaceable citizens is nothing more than interference with
their liberty. The neutral resents such interference, not al-
together as a matter of dollars and cents, but also as involving
his guaranteed rights and privileges. 25 The American citizen
is naturally opposed to war but he is not in the habit of taking
part in one in which he has no immediate concern. He does not
see the morality of interfering with the legitimate trade of
peaceable citizens because a few foreign nations see fit to disturb
the world's peace to gratify a desire to take possession of a strip
of territory which at some time during the past ages may have be-
longed to themselves.
The fact to which both Germany and Austria-Hungary refer
that they are not able to intercept the contraband with the enemy26
can not affect the status of neutrality of the United States.
From the neutral view point the German inability to stop munitions
from flowing into the enemy territory has no greater significance
than the failure of the Allied forces to take Constantinople.
The one is a naval failure, the other an army failure. Moreover,
35. Spaight, War Rights orTIanl;" pp. 475-476: rIf~a~neutral
power were held responsible for all the commercial transactions
of its subjects with belligerents, most of the nations of the
world would have to rewrite their constitutions whenever a war
began. The outbreak of hostilities between two states would
have the effect of establishing in every country not partici-
pating in the war a system of governmental interference with
private persons and their business transactions which would
have only to be tried once to stand condemned as intolerable
and impossible."
26. Dr. Dernburg - Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1915: "Ger-
many does not question the legal rights of neutral citizens
to trade in munitions of war; she has only complained of in-
equality of treatment she i3 receiving, in that food-stuffs
are shut out of Germany whereas there is free transit of arms
to Great Britain."

48
the German contention is inconsistent with her practice in the
past. For Example, Germany's conduct during the Crimean far was
the same as that of the United States, against which she now com-
plains. During that war large quantities of arms and military
stores were supplied to Russia by the manufacturers and merchants
of Belgium and Prussia, notwithstanding the fact that the Prussian
Government had expressly prohibited the transport of munitions of
war from a foreign state to the belligerents. Since the trans-
port took place entirely by land, the Anglo-French belligerents
had no opportunity to protect themselves against the traffic by
any exercise of the right of capturing contraband at sea. 27 The
differences in this case and in the present war are, to say the
least, not of such a nature as to strengthen the German^- Austrian
contention during the present war.
In addition to the complaints by the German and Austrian
Governments, a great many Americans have contended that the
United States should prohibit the shipment of munitions from the
country, in order to preserve its neutrality. The Government
explained its stand in four communications from the State Depart-
ment. First, in a circular to the American People, issued October
15, 1914, by the State Department, with reference to 'Neutrality
and Trade in Contraband'. The Secretary summed up the laws of
the United States so far as they pertain to trade in contraband.
The essential parts are as follows: "In the first place it should
27. Tflfestlake, Collected Papers on International Law; p. 365.
See also Earl Granville's note to Count Bernstorff of Sept.
15, 1870 in British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 61, pp.
759-766.
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be understood that, generally speaking a citizen of the United
States can sell to a belligerent government or agent any article
of commerce which he pleases. He is not prohibited from doing
this by any rule of international law, by any treaty provision,
or by any statute of the United States. It makes no difference
whether the articles sold are exclusively for war purposes, such
as firearms, explosives, etc., or are food-stuffs, clothing, horses
etc. for the use of the army or navy of the belligerents.
"Furthermore, a neutral Government is not compelled by
international law, by treaty, or by statute to prevent these sales
to a belligerent. Such sales therefore, by American citizens do
not in the least affect the neutrality of the United States,
"Neither the president nor any executive authority of the
government possesses the legal authority to interfere in any way
with trade between the people of this country and the territory
of a belligerent. There is no act of Congress conferring such
authority or prohibiting traffic of this sort with European
nations, although in the case of neighboring American Republics,
Congress has given the President power to proclaim an embargo on
arms and ammunition when in his judgment it would tend to prevent
civil strife.
"For the Government of the United States itself to sell to
a belligerent nation would be an unneutral act, but for a private
individual to sell to a belligerent any product of the United
States is neither unlawful nor unneutral, nor within the power of
the executive to prevent or control,
"The foregoing remarks however do not apply to the out-
fitting or furnishing of vessels in American ports or of mili-
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tary expeditions on American soil in aid of a belligerent. These
acts are prohibited by the neutrality laws of the United States. "2*
On January 30, 1915, in a letter to Senator Stone,, Secre-
tary Bryan wrote: "There is no power in the executive to prevent
the sale of ammunition to the belligerents. The duty of the
neutral to restrict trade in munitions of war has never been im-
posed by international law or by municipal statute. It has
never been the policy of this government to prevent the shipment
of arms or ammunition into belligerent territory, except in the
case of neighboring American Republics and then only when civil
strife prevailed 1. Even to this extent the belligerents in the
present conflict when they were neutrals, have never, so far as
the records disclose, limited the sale of munitions of war.* * *
The United States has itself taken no part in contraband traffic,
and has, so far as possible, lent its influence toward equal
treatment for all belligerents in the matter of purchasing arms
and ammunition of private persons in the United States. "29
In the note of April 31, 1915 the Secretary wrote in re-
sponse to the German memorandum of April 4, 1915:" I note with
sincere regret that, in discussing the sale and exportation of
arms by citizens of the United States to the enemies of Germany,
Your Excellency seems to be under the impression that it was with-
in the choice of the United States, notwithstanding its professed
neutrality and its dilligent efforts to maintain it in other par-
ticulars, to inhibit this trade, and that its failure to do so
mainfested an unfair attitude toward Germany."
38. Text found in the American Journal of International Law, Supp.
Jan. 1915, pp. 134-136.
39. European War, No. 3, p. 58.
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Finally, in reply to the Austrian note of June 39, 1915
the Secretary of State explained at some length why the United
States took its position: "The Government of the United States
is surprised to find the Imperial and Royal Government implying
that the observance of the strict principles of law under the
conditions which have developed in the present war is ^sufficient
,
and Asserting that this Government should go beyond the long-
recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals and adopt
measures to "maintain an attitude of strict parity with respect
to both belligerent parties." To this assertion of an obliga-
tion to change or modify the rules of international usage on ac-
count of special conditions the Government of the United States
can not accede. The recognition of an obligatior of this sort,
unknown to the international practice of the past, would impose
upon every neutral nation a duty to sit in judgment on the progress
of a war and to restrict its commercial intercourse with a belli-
gerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade
with the enemy.
"The contention of the Imperial and Royal Government ap-
pears to be that the advantages gained to a belligerent by its
superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral powers
by the establishment of a system of non-intercourse with the victor.
"Manifestly the idea of strict neutrality now advanced by
the Imperial and Royal Government would involve a neutral nation
in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of
international obligation, produce economic confusion and deprive
all commerce and industry of legitimate fields of enterprise,
already burdened by the unavoidable restrictions of war. 11
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Mr. Lansing- called attention to the fact that in the
past, Austria-Hungary and Germany, especially the latter had ex-
ported arms in larger quantities than any other country, not
only in time of peace but in times of war, and he remarks, that
"never during that period did either of them suggest or apply
the principle now advocated by the Imperial and Royal Government,
11
In each of these cases, contentions put forward were
declared to be inconsistent with the rights of neutrals and the
established rules of war-fare. Such claims seem to be a result
of belligerents holding different views in regard to certain
matters than when they are neutral. Thus, in view of these
contentions of a few years previous, both Germany and the United
States af the Hague Conference of 1907 joined in the unanimous
vote that contraband trade should be unrestricted in times of
war. Such countries as Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, and
Great Britain which have large munitions' industries are unwill-
ing to legislate away their rights to profit by them in time of
war when the demand end prices are best, even though in time of
war one may suffer from the effects of vast quantities being ship-
ped into the territory of its enemy from one or more of the other
countries 3^ which have extensive munitions' industries. If this
is true of all nations, in general, it is idle to think or expect
one country to take it upon itself to restrict such trade when
all the others are involved in war.
30. International jurists (Westlake and Bluntschli) at the time
of the Franco-German war, both German and English foresaw
that the trade which had assumed such great proportions in
the war then being waged would be restricted for the wars of
the future immediately upon the restoration of peace, and so
today we hear the same predictions.
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Nations which do not manufacture munitions on a large scale are
opposed to restrictions on trade in time of war "because such
restrictions would interfere with their only chance of equipping
their armies after war has broken cut.
To cite the practice in the wars of the past would be
merely to reiterate facts familiar to all readers. "The growth
of a moral sentiment against making money out of the miseries of
war-fare" says Lawrence "may in time check the eagerness of neu-
tral merchants to engage in contraband trade. Meanwhile belli-
gerents must trust to the efficiency of their own measures of
police on the high 3eas to keep cargoes of warlike stores out of
the ports of their enemies. "31
Even granting that neutral states should impose some re-
strictions on contraband trade carried on by its citizens, it must
be admitted that the neutral state shall be the judge as to when
1
31. Principles, International Law, pp.. 699-703. Also Snow gives
an excellent summary of the situation in the following words
found in International Law-Naval War College, SEd, 1898; pp.
134-136: "When it comes to the shipment of . heavy guns,
rifles, and ammunitions in enormous quantities, it has been
argued that there is hardly much difference in principle be-
tween such sales and those of ships; that the one may af-
fect the course of the war as much as the other.* * * Per-
haps international law may develop in the direction of limit-
ing such trade, but this seems doubtful at present, and the
German practice in the war between Spain and the United States,
did not 3eem to conform to such theories. The trade between
Krupps 1 establishments in Germany and Spain in war-like stores,
carried overland, apparently suffered no restrlcj"rhe great
difficluty of making a distinction between contraband upon a
large and small scale would alone present a serious obstacle
to such a rule. On the whole, we may conclude that the as-
sumption by the neutral states of the task of preventing con-
traband trade is not likely to be undertaken for the benefit
of belligerents as an addition to the other and increasing
duties required from the neutral state during modern warfare."
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the trade has reached such proportions as to endanger its neu-
trality. If left to the judgment of each of the belligerents
there would clearly be no agreement and ultimately, trade of all
kinds would depend upon the caprice of war, 32 for it must be
remembered that there is no agreement as to what even constitutes
contraband.
The Foregoing discussion shows that international law and
practice sanction the right of neutral individuals to trade in con-
J
traband with belligerent nations. Would it therefore be unneu-
tral to prohibit them from doing so? This question has come up
in the present war. Not only the governments of the Central
Powers but a great many American citizen.3 have asked the govern-
ment to lay an embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions as
a neutrality measure. While there have been a number of instances
of embargoes having been laid in the wars of the past, there are
no instances in which they were resorted to as a neutrality meas-
ure. In some cases they have been laid in accordance with treaty
stipulations but in most cases they are laid as measures of nation-
al policy, either as a usual practice in times of war, or as the
special circumstances of any war may determine. In the present
case it is argued that for the United States Government to lay
an embargo on munitions would be unneutral. We will make an in-
33. Moore-Digest, Vol. VII, p. 958: Such a point was brought
out by Mr. Seward in reply to a protest by Mexico: "If Mexico
shall prescribe to us what merchandise we shall not sell to
French subjects, because it may be employed in military opera-
tions against Mexico, France must equally be allowed to dic-
tate to us what merchandise we shall allow to be shipped to
Mexico, because it might be belligerently used against France.
Every other nation which is at war would have a similar right,
and every other commercial nation would be bound to respect
it as much as the United States. Commerce in that case, in-
stead of being free or independent, would exist only at the
caprice of war.
"
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vestigation into this phase of the subject. An embargo would
first of all require the passage of a law33 and the consequent
repeal of several of the existing neutrality laws. It involves
legal and moral principles, international and municipal considera-
tions; in fact, the general questions of militarism and democracy,
in addition to the great and ever present consideration of neu-
trality.
There may well be doubt as to the effectiveness of en-
forcing such an embargo. There are two difficulties to be en-
countered in the United States, which would exist, perhaps to a
greater extent, than in any other country. 35 First, the great
33. In ordinary times of peace there being no executive power
resembling the royal perogative in monarchical countries, any
such regulations Y/ould have to be made in the ordinary way for
it would need take the form of law. Spaight, War Rights on
land, p. 479, says, n in case a prohibition is made, it is an
instance of municipal law imposing a greater obligation than
international law."
34. Westlake, Collected Papers on International Law, p. 390:" A
mere municipal law may not confer a complete right on a for-
eign state, so that a failure in its due execution would be
recognized as in itself sufficient ground for a demand of in-
demnity; but a failure to execute it to the best ability of the-
government would be one of the strongest proofs of unfriendli-
ness, and as long as international relations are guided by pol-
icy rather than by law, the tention of those relations, due to
an unfriendliness pointedly testified, will continue to be a
much surer road to war than one of the minor breaches of inter-
national law, which might be overlooked or atoned for."
35. Wharton, as cited by Moore, VIJ, p. 971: "To establish a na-
tional policy which could prevent the sale of such (staples)
would impose on neutral states a burden, not only intolerable,
but incompatible with constitutional traditions. It might be
possible in islands the size of Great Britain; but in a coun-
try so vast as the United States, and with an ocean frontier
so extended, it would be impossible to establish a police that
could preclude such exportation without vesting in the national
government powers and patronage inconsistent with republican
institutions, and so enormously expensive as to make it more
economical to interpose in a war as a belligerent than to watch
such war as a neutral.
"
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extent of sea coast and consequent force required to effectively
police it to see that no munitions were loaded on ships; and
secondly, the great degree of liberty which the American citizen
enjoys does not make for the enforcement of laws which can be
construed in any way as interfering with those fights.
Nor is the case entirely hypothetical; we have the case
of President Grant forbidding the State Arsenals to sell arms to
the belligerents in 1870-71, and even in this case the order was
circumvented by American merchants buying arms from the arsenals
and then shipping them to France. "The export of arms to France
was carried on quite openly and on an enormous scale, and the
impossibility of effectually checking the trade wa3 indeed admit-
ted by the German authorities themselves, who instructed the North
36
German Consul at New York not to interfere with it. " Spaight
says, "in practice it is absolutely impracticable to control the
sale of munitions of war when the market conditions are good,
that is, when the demand exceeds the supply. 37
An act of Congress changing our neutrality laws during
the progress of a war is bound to have some influence, direct or
otherwise on the belligerents. It will in any ca3e affect them
differently. 38 In so doing it would be contrary to the spirit of
neutrality. Of course, the matter of neutrality is, in the main
36. Hozier, Franco-Prussian War, Vol. II; p. 179.
37. War Rights on Land; pp. 477-478: He cites a number of incidents
to support the following statement: "Neither patriotism, nor
Beaurocratic vigilance, "nor national sympathy with the belli-
gerents cause is sufficient to prevent men who have arms to
sell them to a belligerent who will pay well for them.
"
3 8. Mr. Sutherland, Speech in Congress (Jan. 37, 1916 - Cong.
Record; p. 1798) "If peace prevailed throughout the world, we
might pa3S an act prohibiting for the future the transporta-
tion of munitions of war from our country to any other country
without affecting the question of neutrality at all. But this

a policy which is determined upon by the nation acting through
its government. In general, neutral nations may allow or refuse
to allow their citizens to trade in contraband. Most writers
state the existing rule as it was drawn up by the Hague, Conven-
tion 13, Article 7, of which reads "A neutral power is not bound
to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belliger-
ent, of arms, ammunitions, or, in general, of anything which
could be of use to any army or fleet." From the negative state-
ment, we may reasonably assume that a nation may prevent such ex-
port but it is plainly stipulated that it is not bound to prevent
it.^ As a matter of fact, however, neutral nations have almost
universally asserted and maintained the right of their citizens
is not the situation. A condition of war prevails in Europe.
It is idle for us to pretend that the act of Congress with
reference to this question will not have a very profound ef-
fect upon the warring nations in Europe. If we should pass
a law here prohibiting the shipment of munitions abroad it
would be a very great aid to and would very greatly strengthen
the hands of one of the contending parties in the war."
On the same day, Representative Townsend remarked in a speech
"Tie could not be embarrassed if at this time we take action
which certainly we had a right to take at the beginning of
the war and which has been postponed too long already."
39. Congressional Record; Jan. 37, 1916, p. 1798 - Mr. Smoot
remarked, "The question of a prohibition at this late date
will meet difficulties that would not have been met if a pro-
hibition had been imposed at the beginning of the war, and
might perhaps be very embarrassing for our country to enforce,
but he takes into consideration no differences in the exist-
ing conditions. As. Prof, Westlake wrote during the Franco-
Prussian War, concerning the charges made by Prussia to Eng-
land against her unneutral conduct in allowing her citizens
to sell munitions to France: "It must be allowed that to
change an existing rule to the prejudice of one belligerent
during the war, and that in compliance with the express re-
quest of the other belligerent that our neutrality should be
made favorable to him, would be a clear breach of neutrality
even though there might be the most excellent reasons for
giving a general preference to the new rule on future oc-
casions." - Collected Papers on International Law; p.
378.

to trade in contraband. 40 Germany, has by virtue of her well
developed munitions industry profited more perhaps than any other
nation. The United States has from the first, "allowed its citi-
zens to make, vend, and export arms" to belligerent nations sub-
ject always to the risk of punishment by way of confiscation if
captured by the opposing belligerent. Professor Moore cites
eighteen pages of extracts from various presidents and secretaries
of state, in nearly all of which this policy^repeated as being
that of the United States. 41
In contradiction to the view frequently expressed, there
is reason for the existing practice of allowing neutral nations
to furnish munitions to belligerents, both from the standpoint of
neutrals and the necessity for arms on the part of the belligerent;
the practice doe3 not therefore exist simply because there is no
law against it. As to the quantity of this trade, it has been
shown there is no practicable way of limiting it.
Trade in contraband by private persons is largely regulated';
by municipal law and the international practice is based entire-ly
upon a compromise between the municipal laws of the belligerent
and neutral states. The neutral state is not held responsible
for seeing that its citizens send as many cannon balls to Germany
as to France, in time of war, any more than it is responsible for
seeing that the same number of plows are sent to Russia as to
Guatemala in times of peace. If, therefore, an attempt is made
by the government to interfere in any way, there may be a con-
40, Lawrence principles of International Law, p. 699.
41. international Law Digest, Vol. VII; pp. 955 - 973,
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flict,, international law. 43 The Government at Washington, m
choosing its course, has taken into consideration the welfare of
its own citizens and at the same time has attempted to abide by
the established rules of international law. The first considera-
tion was and should have been, for the welfare of the American
citizens, who, as a result of the war in which they had no part
found their commerce suddenly cut off, not only the belligerent
powers which soon included the greater part of Europe, but also
with the rest of the world because the great part of American
shipping is done in foreign vessels. The natural result was
that the American industries were greatly interfered with, many
men were thrown out of employment, and other bad conditions pre-
vailed. -Thus when there was opportunity for improvement, ree
suiting from the clearing of the seas of one hostile fleet, and
the development of great need for munitions, it would have been a
doubtful policy for the Government to have interfered and prohibit-
ed it.
Thus in opposition to the embargo on munitions the ques-
tion of national policy was a determining factor. This was
brought out in Secretary Lansing's reply4^ to the Austrian note:-
"But in addition to the questions of principle, there is a practi-
cal and substantial reason why the government of the United
States has from the foundation of the Republic to the present time
advocated and practiced unrestricted trade in arms and military
42. Mr. Bryan:* "This Government holds that any change in its
own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war which
would affect unequally the relations of the united States with
the nations at war would be unjustifiable departure from the
principles of strict neutrality, by .rtiich it has consistently
sought to direct its actions.
"
43. The note referred to was dated Aug. 12, 1915, Supplement-The
American Journal of International Law: Vol. IX, Jul. '15,p.l68.

supplies. It has never been the policy of the country to main-
tain in time of peace a large military establishment, or stores of
arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well equipped
and powerful enemy. It has desired to remain at peace with all
nations and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the
threat of its armies and navies. In consequence of this standing
policy the United States would, in the event of an attack by a
foreign power be at the outset of a war seriously, if not fatally,
embarrassed by this lack of arms and ammunition and by means to
produce them in sufficient quantities to supply the requirements
of national defense. The United States has always depended up-
on the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neu-
tral nations in case of foreign attack. This right, which it
claims for itself, it cannot deny to others. 1,44
In the same note it is argued that should the theory that
neutral nations ought to prohibit the sal.e of arms and ammunition
be generally adopted, it would result ultimately in every nation
becoming an armed camp. The Secretary pointed out that this would
44. This point was emphasized by Representative Robinson in a speech
in the House (Jan. 27, 1916-Cong. Record; p. 1797): During all
the wars in which ?/e have been engaged . the United States
has been compelled to purchase abroad much of the munitions
which we have used in war. While it is true that as a result
of the increase in this trade we are now manufacturing in the
United States greater quantities of munitions than ever before
in the history of the country, it is also true that at this
time we are not equipped with sufficient machinery and factories
to supply the demands of the United States in case she should
become involved in war. In considering the matter of placing
an embargo on arms and munitions, we should bear in mind the
necessities of the United States itself, and not too quickly
commit this government to a policy which would deny her the
means of self-defense in case we should become involved in a
war with a foreign power. For if we assert as a doctrine of
humanity, or as a doctrine of international law, that a neutral
nation cannot sell arms to a belligerent, then we must expect
to have that doctrine invoked and applied against us in case we
should find ourselves compelled to combat an agressive enemy.

force militarism on the world and work against universal peace.
45
As to the argument advanced by the Austrian note that the
Hague Convention by means of its general terms allowed a departure
under peculiar circumstances from the specific wording of Article
73 Mr. Lansing replied that it was for the neutral
state to
decide as to when such case had arisen and not for the belligerent.
It might be well to bear in mind that the United States does not
base its argument entirely upon the Hague Convention but upon
the principles and practices cf international law as well.
The question as to why, if it is not an unneutral act to
furnish supplies to one side in the conflict, would it be unneu-
tral to place an embargo on arms and munitions even though it did
work to the disadvantage of one side only, was answered in the
following manner.
Trade in contraband is an established practice, and is
normally the rule whereas embargoes are exceptional and cannot be
resorted to if the effect is to deprive one of the belligerents
of substantial advantages which he has already gained over his
enemy. 46 Germany contends that were an embargo established, she
could end the war within three months: The Anglo-French Allies
would admit that such an embargo would work very much to their
disadvantage. It is clear that under the circumstances then it
would be giving a decisive advantage to the one side if an embargo
were laid; it would affect only one side, but the advantage in
the latter case would come from the act of a neutral state, and
not as in the prevailing condition, from the successes of one of
45. SuppTemirit7"Ame
r
I carTJournal of Int ernatIoliaT~Taw7~Vo 1. IX, Jul.
1915, p. 169.
46. This view is expressed by Professor Garner in his article, pre
viously referred to inthe American Journal of international
Law, July, 1916.
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the belligerent parties.
Would it have been unneutral for the United States to have
established an embargo at the beginning of the war? At this time,
it would not have been an unneutral act; the seas were open to
all ships of all nations. No nation had any advantage; regard-
less of the fact that German ships were driven from the seas with-
in a few weeks, and the Allies would have been without ammunition
in due time; the situation would have early arisen in that event
which^ui-fcirffiately arise now were the American supplies cut off, yet
it would have been within the bounds of neutrality at that time. 4 ?
It would have been bad policy for the United States both from a
national standpoint and from the view point of American industry
but the legality from the international side is unquestioned. The
fact that practically all the European nations with the possible
exception of Germany and Austria, depend upon neutral markets for
war supplies of arms and munitions, as does the United States,
would not have altered the situation because nations are given the
right to allow or refuse to allow their citizens to deal in contra-
band trade with belligerents; even though the warring countries
had depended upon neutral countries for their supplies in time of
war, there are no agreements by which such supplies are guaranteed.
If, as the State Department maintains, it is a breach of
neutrality to put an embargo on the export of munitions at such a
47. Senator Lodge, speaking at the Worcester Chamber of Commerce
banquet said, "If we had put this embargo on in August of the
year the war started, while it might not have been good business
policy perhaps, no great objection could have been registered
against it, as conditions were entirely different. As the war
now stands one side can import freely. The other side cannot
import at all. It would simply place the nation or side which
has lost control of the seas on the same basis with the nation
or side which has gained control of the sea. "
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time as this, are we not forced to admit ultimately that an em-
bargo could not be laid even though the vital interests of the
country demanded it? This is a pertinent question because it
has come up a number of times during the present war. It has
been earnestly argued in Congress and in the press at different
times, that an embargo should be proclaimed to protect national
interests, 48 as a retaliatory measure for the unlawful acts of
Great Britain, and for other reasons. If the principle be true
that an embargo at this time would be an unneutral act, any
reason which might be given for laying one would not be sufficient
to keep the Allies from complaining of an unneutral, or even an
unfriendly act on the part of the United States.
We will answer these questions after considering actual
cases of countries in the present war which placed embargoes on
the export of munitions after the war had broken out, and even
after Great Britain had gained control of the seas. There are
some important differences. Holland and Denmark had their mar-
kets open to Germany by land, as well as to Great Britain by sea.
Also, as in the case of Norway, Sweden, and Spain the embargoes
on munitions were laid ostensibly to preserve the supplies for
after
their armies, as most of these countries mobilized^ the outbreak of
the war. Only, in so far as such actions have in the past been
considered by belligerents as sufficient and bona fide reasons of
48, Cong. Record, Jan 27, 1916; p. 1794 - Senator Hitchcock said,
the wheat shipping was being held up and agricultural interests
thereby imperilled because the ocean-going ships were carrying
munitions of war instead of grain. He maintained that an em-
bargo is therefore a matter of domestic concern, "not only be-
cause of the legitimate interests which are imperilled, but
because it is no business of any country in Europe, whether
we place an embargo upon the exportation of arms and ammuni-
tion or whether we do not?

a non-intentional interference on behalf of either belligerents
in. the struggle, it would be a better excuse in the eyes of the
belligerents that any reasons the United States might offer at this
time. Nevertheless, whatever be the reason, whether it be retalia-
tion for wrongs committed by the belligerent, or as a matter of
state policy, an embargo which would affect the contending parties
unequally must be construed as unnequal. Applying this doctrine
to the European countries, then in which the effects were unequal
upon the different belligerents, we must conclude they were
breaches of neutrality, whether any nations complained or not.
As to the justification, and this applies to the United States,
as well, national policy may justify a breach of neutrality, just
as it may" at times justify open hostilities. If, in the opinion
of any soverign state, national expediency demands certain action,
which would be in conflict with neutral duty, the state owes
obligations to itself above those of belligerents. This is a
dangerous rule unless judiciously applied. It is respectfully
submitted that the present circumstances would not alter the
position the Administration has taken thus far in the present war.
A few charges which have come to the attention of the
State Department from the German and Austrian Foreign Offices and
from the Press should be considered. Some are only of relative
importance and are referred to in this connection only to define
the position of the administration in regard to them, that we may
determine whether or not the United States has been consistent
in the adopted policy.
First, in regard to the action of Great Britain in cutting
off the German food supply and in otherwise interferring with

neutral commerce. If, as the German and Austrian protests charged]
Great Britain exceeded her legal rights, the United States would
be justified in demanding; reparation. It is fitting to say here
that the United States ha3 taken the view that the actions of Great
Britain are within the rights of a belligerent power, 43 and the
seeming disadvantages to Germany are due to Great Britain's
superior naval strength. A neutral is not bound to see that one
belligerent gains no advantage of the other; 50 there is no justi-
fication for a neutral nation to depart from the rule of impar-
tiality, unless, of course, it wants it* neutrality to cease. 01
Opinions differ and some disagree with the Secretary of
State with respect to Great Britain's restrictions on American
commerce. ' It presents a real problem in itself and cannot be
discussed here. Suffice it to say, that even though the action
of Great Britain in maintaining an irregular blockade is a viola-
tion of the rights of the United States as a neutral, there is
no doubt that the United States must determine for itself when
it is justified in taking retaliatory action; Secretary Lansing
brought this point cut very clearly in his note to the Austro-
Hungarian Government, 52 in which we find the following: "The right
and duty when this necessity exists rests with the neutral, not
with a belligerent. It is discretionary, not mandatory. If a
49. Secretary Lansing to the German Ambassador April 31, 1915.
50. Kent, International Law; (1866), p. 385.
51. In 1812, the United States availed itself of the opportunity
of establishing an embargo as a preliminary to the outbreak
of war, Moore, VII. p. 143-44. This embargo, as a pre-
liminary to the outbreak of war, is sometimes considered a re-
taliatory measure, but was in fact the prelude to the war which
was imminent.
52. Note of August 12, 1915. American Journal of international
Law, Vol. IX: July 1915, p. 170.
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neutral power does not avail itself of the right a belligerent is
not privileged to complain, for in doing so it would toe in the
position of declaring to the neutral power what is necessary to
protect that power*s own rights."
in the Austro-Hungarian note of June 39, 1915, the minis-
ter for Foreign affairs suggested that the United States seemed to
have departed from the Thirteenth Hague Convention" in the preven-
tion of the delivery of vessels of war and in the prevention of
certain deliveries to vessels of belligerent nations." Secretary
Lansing replied that it was only necessary to point out that the
prohibition of supplies to ships of war rests upon the principle
that a neutral power must not permit its territory to become a
naval base for either belligerent. "To permit merchant vessels
acting as tenders to carry supplies more often than three months,
and in unlimited quantities," said Mr. Lansing, would defeat the
purpose of the rule and might constitute the neutral territory a
naval base.
"
On April 4, 1915 the German Ambassador in a memorandum5^
to the State Department appealed to the United States to put an
53. "If it is the will of the American people that there shall be
a true neutrality, the United States will find means of pre-
venting this onesided supply of arms or at least of utiliz-
ing it to protect legitimate trade with Germany, especially
that in food-stuffs. This view should all the more appeal
to the United States Government because the latter enacted a
similar policy toward Mexico." The Ambassador then calls at-
tention to the speech President Wilson made (Feb. 3, 1914)
with reference to withdrawing the embargo on the importation
of arms into Mexico,
At this time the President said, "As the conditions on which
the proclamation of March 14, 1912 was based, have essentially
changed, and as it is desirable to place the United States
with reference to the exportation of arms or munitions of war
to Mexico in the same position, as other powers, the said
proclamation is hereby revoked. The Executive order under
which the exportation of arms and ammunition into Mexico is

embargo on munitions, citing the action taken in Mexico as a pre-
cedent for the action. Mr. Bryan replied that, "in dealing with
Mexico we put an embargo on munitions of war, but that was not the
act of a neutral nation. It was the act of one intervening in-
directly in the war to bring about a certain result. When we
were occupying Vera Cruz, although not at war with Mexico, a ship-
ment of German arms which would have been contraband if there had
been a state of war, reached its Mexican consignees and would have
been used against our troops if they had been obliged to undertake
more extensive operations."
The action in this case cannot be considered as coming
under the rules- of international law. 54 The United States had not
forbidden was a joint resolution of Congress—determined upon
in circumstances which have now ceased to exist. It was in-
tended to discourage incipient revolts against the regularly
constituted authorities of Mexico. Since that order was is-
sued the circumstances have undergone a radical change" (Amer-
ican Journal of International Law, July 1914; p. 580)
54. Professor Canfield, in a press dispatch gave out the following:
"There is no parallelism between our relations to Mexico and
our relation to the belligerents in Europe." He points out
that in dealing with Mexico in prohibiting the export of arms,"
President Wilson was acting under an express statute of Con-
gress, which was passed in recognition of our peculiar rela-
tions to Mexico and of the possibility that the arms exported
to Mexico might some day be used against us. It is to be
noted also in the case of Mexico we are dealing not with one
friendly state, which was at war with another friendly state,
but with two factions contending for mastery within a single
state. And we dealt impartially with both factions, depriv-
ing neither of any advantage to which it was legitimately en-
titled as against the other. In the case of the belligerent
nations of Europe the situation is a very different one. Our
relations to them are governed by the rules of international
law. "
That Mr. Taft thinks the conditions are essentially different
is attested by the following letter to Professor von Mach. It
will be recalled that owing to his recommendation the act of
Congress was passed giving the President authority to lay an
embargo on arms to Mexico, which he very soon put in effect.
In the letter to Professor von Mach, referred to he said, "I
cannot think that it would be wise to pas3 a law changing all
the rules of international law heretofore prevailing with re-
spect to the sale of ammunition and arms to belligerents by

6jr ,
recognized the contending parties in Mexico as "belligerents, so
in a legal sense, there was no war in Mexico. If there is no war
there can technically be no neutrals, for the term presupposes the
existence of belligerents.
Another point in connection with munitions which caused an
exchange of diplomatic notes was the contention by Germany that
Hydro-aeroplanesSS are -war vessels. On January 19, 1915 the
German Ambassador entered a protest in which he 3aid, "There can
be no doubt that Hydro-Aeroplanes must be regarded as war vessels,
whose delivery to belligerent states by neutrals should be stopped
under Article 8 of the Thirteenth Convention of the Second Hague
Conference. Hydro-Aeroplanes are not mentioned by name in the
convention simply because there wire none at the time of the confer-
j
ence. "
Secretary Bryan replied that the fact that Hydro - Aero-
planes arise from and alight upon the sea does not give them the
character of a vessel£b He then called attention to the fact that
neutral countries. Nor do I think in the present exigency it
would be an act of neutrality to do so, because it would inure
only to the benefit of one of the belligerents."
55. From press dispatch of Dec. 1916: The Curtiss works at Ham-
mondsport, N.Y. have sold and sent to England the well known
hydro-aeroplane, America, and five hydro-aeroplanes of the
same type. Thirty-six hydro-aeroplanes of a different type
have been ordered by England and are under construction by
the same firm. Also Russia has ordered a number of these
vessels from Curtiss for use in her navy.
56. From Note of January 29,; "The fact that a hydro-aeroplane is
fitted with apparatus to arise from and alight upon sea, does
not, in my opinion, give it the character of a vessel any
more than the wheels attached to an aeroplane fitting it to
arise and alight upon land give the latter the character of a
land vehicle. Both the hydro-aero-plane and the aeroplane
are essentially air-crafts; as an aid in military operations,
they can only be used in the air; the fact that one starts
its flight from the surface of the sea, and the other from
land is a mere incident, which in no way alters their aerial
character;
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the Imperial Government includes ballons and flying machines and
their component parts as conditional contraband. Since there
are no specific rule3 bearing upon this particular type of machine
the argument of the Secretary may be deemed conclusive.
During the course of the war, complaints have been made
that submarines built in the United States have been delivered to
the allies. One charge was made by Count Bernstorf that submar-
ines were being built for the Allies by the Seattle Dry Dock and
Construction Company. The Navy Department made a careful in-
vestigation, and measures were taken to prevent further deliveries
during the war.
It was- found that the Schwab Companies were making sub-
marine parts to be shipped to Canada; there to be assembeled and
used by the Allies. President Vision decided such a course
would be a violation of the spirit of neutrality and Mr. Schwab
promised that none of the submarines built in his factories would
1
n In view of these facts I must dissent from your Excellency's
assertion that " there is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must
be regarded as war vessels," and consequently, I do not re-
gard the obligations imposed by treaty or by the accepted
rules of international law applicable to air craft of the
latest kind. I further call to your excellency's atten-
tion that, according to the latest devices received by this
department, the German Government includes "balloons and
flying machines and their component parts," in the list of
conditional contraband, and that in the imp-rial prize or-
dinance, drafted Sept. 10, 1910, and issued in the Reichs
Gesetzblatt on August 3, 1914, appear as conditional con-
traband "airships and flying machines" (article 23, section
8). It thus appears that the Imperial Government has
placed and still" retains air craft of all descriptions in
the class of conditional contraband, for which no special
treatment involving neutral duty is, so far as I am advised,
provided by any treaty to which the United States is a
signatory or adhering Power.
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be delivered till after the war. 57
Upon complaints made by Germany that the parts were 3till
being shipped to Canada, investigations failed to reveal any
evidence that such was the case. The State and Navy Departments
have continued to make frequent inquiries into the situation and
have not found that the promise by Mr. Schwab was being violated.
We now come to a consideration of the unofficial and semi-
official acts carried on by the German and Austro-Hungarian
officials and sympathizers. These acts have been wide spread,
and in some instances there has been evidence indicating that
the work carried on was approved if not encouraged by the same
government, No positive proofs of this have as yet been pro-
duced, but there is a general feeling throughout the country that
the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments have permitted their
representatives to the United States to, at least, violate
American hospitality which they enjoyed, and at a time when con-
ditions render the position of the United States extremely criti-
cal.
The extent of this propoganda is not, and perhaps will
never be known, nor the extent to which the governments of the
respective nations are responsible. The investigations by the
Federal Grand Juries and Secret Service Agents brought out many
57. During the Russo-Japanese war it was charged that the German
government failed to prevent, if it did not directly or in-
directly encourage, the sale to Russia of a number of trans-
atlantic steamers belonging to its auxiliary navy, and that
it permitted the exportation overland of torpedo boats to
Russia, the several parts ofthe vessels being exported as
half furnished manufactures and put together in Russian ports,
this for the purpose of disguising the real nature of the
transactions thus avoiding the charge of non-conformity to
the technical rules of neutrality relating to the sale of
war vessels to belligerents. See Hersehy, international Law and
Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War; pp. 91-S3.

plots against manufacturing concerns, railroad companies, and
steamship lines, either by attempts to destroy them or by incit-
ing labor troubles in them. No doubt many accusations made by
the daily papers have been unjustified, 5B but many cases have
been established by undeniable evidence or self confession.
The case of the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, was one
of the first and most notorious, because of the high position he
occupied in the United States, and the diplomatic immunities whict
he enjoyed. He admitted that he proposed to his government
plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants en-
gaged in the production of munitions of war, and that he employed
an American citizen to bear official dispatches to his govern-
ment. 5y * He was for these reasons declared to be no longer ac-
ceptable to the United States and was accordingly recalled.
The action of the President was the only course to be tak-
58. Dr. Franz Boaz of Columbia University said, n We decry the
hysterical intolerance that characterizes the utterances of
a great part of the Eastern press and of many citizens who
should know better the absurd mania of denunication and
espionage that sees a plot in every accident, such as any
expert chemist would expect in a dangerous industry that
is carried on by inexperienced workmen working overtime, and
in every transaction that, owing to war conditions does not
proceed in a normal way,"
59. Official note to the Austro-Hungarian Government: "By reason
of the admitted purpose and intent of Dr. Dumba to conspire
to cripple the legitimate industries of the people of the
United States and interrupt their legitimate trade, and by
reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety by
employing an American citizen protected by an American pass-
port as the secret bearer of official dispatches through the
lines of her enemy to Austria-Hungary, the President directs me;
to inform Your Excellency that Dr. Dumba is no longer accept-
able to the Government of the United States as Ambassador of
His Imperial and Royal Majesty in Washington. Believing the
Imperial and Royal Government will realize that the Government
of the United States has no alternative but to request the
recall of Dr. Dumba on account of his improper conduct, the
Government of the United States expresses its deep regret that
|
this course has become necessary?
*
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1
en consistent with the dignity of the United States. Theie have
"been other examples quite similar to this in the history of the
United States which have been handled in the same manner. 60
Among the effects of the German military and Naval attaches
,
certain papers and documents were discovered which proved beyond
reasonable doubt that these men were involved in far reaching
propaganda against the peace and good order of the United States,
There is not wanting also circumstantial evidence to show that
they were instrumental in stirring up trouble in Mexico and cer-
tain plots against American factories and shipping. 6±
The action of these men were somewhat similar to those of
Citizen Genet in 1793 and the treatment accorded them, likewise
the same.- The United States Government would have been justified
j
in dealing with them more severely than it chose to do, but there
is no ground for breach of neutrality on the part of the United
States for not taking more stringent measures.
60. After the outbreak of the Crimean War, rumors became rife that
a system of enlistments in violation of the neutrality laws of i
the United States was carried on in this country under the su-
pervision of the British Minister, Sir John Crampton, and of
certain British Consuls. Precise proof was eventually dis-
closed at the trial of a man named Hertz. The United States
asked for Crampton's recall together with that of the implicated*
consuls. The British Ministry procrastinated and objected un-
til it became necessary for the United States to act for itself.
Secretary of State, Marcy, accordingly sent to the Minister his ;
passports and revoked the exequaturs of the Consuls 3$ New Yor£,i
Philadelphia, and Cincinnati.
(Political Science Quarterly-Sept. 1915; p. 387-388.
61. As yet it is not known whether Horn, the Vanceboro bridge wreck-
er received his |700 from the German Military attache, Von Papen
before he attempted his work of destruction or after it. The
German Embassy maintains that the money was advanced after the
arrest and for his legal defence. It appears quite clear that
von Papen supplied with funds the man Koenig who was at the
head of a much more destructive propaganda than any with which
Horn was connected.

The arrest of Robert Fay, who claimed to be a lieutenant
of the Saxon Army revealed a series of attempts to destroy Ameri-
can shipping. Fay claimed to be acting through the cooperation
of the German Secret Service though independent of the German
Embassy. 62 with him wsre arrested two accomplices. They were
all arrested for conspiracy in a bomb plot.
More recently plots have been disclosed by the Federal
Grand Jury in San Francisco voting indictments against thirty-
two menS3 and firms on the various charges of conspiracy to organ-
ize a military expedition, plots to blow up Canadian tunnels and
American powder 1 mills, conspiracy to defraud the Government in the
alleged shipping plots involving the destruction of the Retriever,
Sacremento, Mazatlan, the Olson, and Mahone y; the specifications
in the latter charge were given in three groups: Conspiracy to
violate neutrality by making San Francisco a supply base for belli-
gerent ships at sea, conspiracy to defraud through false manifests,
and conspiracy to defeat neutrality by supplying belligerent ship3
63. The German Government has denied that these men were acting un-
der orders in the knowledge of the German Government. It is
suggested that many so called self confessions are made with
the end in view of receiving more lenient treatment for mis-
demeanors, as acts of war.
63. Among these may be mentioned the following: Franz Bopp, con-
sul General for Germany, Baron von Schack, Vice consul general,
Baron von Brincken, attache Maurice Hall, consul general for
Turkey, Dr. Simon Reimer, German naval officer, and other Gerp
man consular officials, and prominent German business men. It
was given out from Washington that these indictments were the
first which the Federal Government has attempted to secure
against any foreign representatives, notwithstanding consular
officers are subject to the jurisdiction of the country in which
they are resident, and may be treated by the law as are any
other persons. The fact that the Government has seen fit to
bring action a-ainst these German and Turkish officials indi-
cates that the Administration intends to prosecute wherever
prosecution will lie, any offender against American neutrality.
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with stores to -which they were not entitled.
No attempt will be made to enumerate the numerous plots
against American arms and munitions factores; it is sufficient
to say there have been many explosives and labor troubles of
various kinds,
6
4 in addition to many plots which were discovered to
prevent their being carried out. There have been many indictment
in which the evidence was clearly against German synpathizers who
were acting against the laws of the United States out of sympathy
for the Fatherland; it may reasonably be expected that in many
other instances the same force has been at work and unsuspected by
64 Gompers in an interview a3 reported by the New York Times -
August 17, 1915, said, "Without regard of any sympathy for the
one or the other side of the nations involved in the war, had it
not been for the honesty of the men at the head of some of these
organizations primarily in interest, there would have been great
strikes inaugurated at the instance of the arent3 of foreign
nations.
Far reaching efforts by foreign influences had been made to stir
up later troubles that would impede the shipment of supplies to
the allies,
66, New York Times - January 21, 1916. In response to the Bennet
resolution asking the names of all persons "arrested in connec-
tion with the criminal plots affecting the neutrality of our
Government," the Attorney General sent to Chairman Webb of the
House Judiciary Committee a list of seventy one individuals
and four corporations indicted for 3uch offenses. The attorney
General said he, could not furnish a list of arrested persons
as it would convey an incomplete and misleading impression.
"Such a list would, not include persons who have been indicted
but never arrested, having become fugitives from justice; it
would not include persons who have been indicted but never ar-
rested, having surrendered to the court, and would include per-
sons arrested and not further proceeded against, as well as
persons arrested and not indicted." He explained that the
list transmitted contained names of all persons who had been
indicted in the Federal courts in connection with criminal plots
affecting the neutrality of our government so far as it related
to the European war, and exclusive of the Mexican situation,
which cases "date back several years and are very numerous.
"
The majority of these were German, although the list contains
the names of five Englishmen who were indicted for enlisting
troops in this country for the British Army. About the same
number are Montenegrins who were arrested in the west for
violating neutrality, by traveling as a military organization
across neutral territory.
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the Federal authorities; equally true is it that there have
been many unwarranted accusations against German sympathizers.
The United States has thus far taken the stand that this activ-
ity by German officers and subjects is being carried on without
knowledge or approval of the German Government, and has accord-
ingly dealt with the various offenders as private persons
guilty of statutory offences.
In addition to the secret agencies which hase been at
work, some acts of a public nature have been done as a part of
the official business of the German Embassy. For example, offi-
cial declarations were published and distributed calling atten-
tion to the fact that "Germans working in factories in neutral
count±ies, particularly in the United States producing war sup-
plies for the enemy, render themselves liable to prosecution
for treason under paragraph 89 of the Penal Code, penalizing
such assistance to an enemy with a maximum of ten years imprison-
ment. "
Large advertisements have at various times been inserted
in the daily papers by the German Embassy warning American citi-
zens not to travel on British ship3 because of the danger in
passing through the war zone. Such notices were published in
the leading eastern papers for a few days preceeding the last
departure of the Lusitania , warning travellers against this
danger. Extensive activities of this kind have been unknown in
the diplomatic history of the past. Without entering into a
discussion as to the rights of diplomatic agents to engage in
3uch activities, there is no doubt that such are not for the
best interests of the country and might be classified as in-
directly interferring with the internal affairs of the country.
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Chapter V.
PROTEST AGAINST THE USE OF DUM DUM BULLETS.
Aside from the general question of munitions, charges
have been lodged against the United States Government for al-
lowing the sale of illegal instruments of warfare, namely dum
dum bullets, by its citizens and also for not protesting against
the use of such by the armies of various belligerents.
As early as Sept. 9, 1914, the German Emperor protested
to the United States against the alleged use, by French and
British soldiers of "bullets which spread and made unnecessar-
ily large and painful wounds." Some time later the Secretary
of State informed the German Ambassador that while the United
States would take under consideration, charges of improper
practice - referring to the use of dum dum bullets - it could
not, in the interest of neutrality, investig&ge or comment on
them.
A result of further protest made by the German Govern-
ment and at least one by the French Government, the United
States saw fit to change its attitude and on January 7, 1915
there appeared in the newspapers an extensive report of an
investigation which the State Department had carried on.
In a note to Count Bernstorff, Secretary Bryan wrote,
"the President directs me to inform you that in case any
American company is shown to be engaged in thi3 traffic he will
use his influence to prevent, so far as possible, sales of

such ammunition to the powers engaged in the European war, with-
out regard to whether it is the duty of this government upon legal
or conventional grounds to take such action.
"
The note continued, "Investigation discloses that the
Remington Arms-Union Metallic Cartridge Co. has sold 100,000 soft
nosed bullets for the use of sportsmen and that the cartridges
will not fit the rifles of any "belligerent. The department is in
receipt from the company of a complete detailed list of the per-
sons to whom these cartridges were sold. From this list it ap-
pears that the cartridges were sold to firms in lots of twenty
to 2,000 and one' lot each of 3,000, 4,000 and 5,000. Of these
only 60 cartridges went to British North America and 100 to
British East Africa. If, however, you can furnish the department
with evidence that this or any other company is manufacturing and
selling for the use of the contending armies in Europe cartridges
whose use would contravene the Hague Convention, the government
would be glad to be furnished with the evidence. n±
The charges made early in the war by the French that the
Germans had used soft nosed bullets, as well as the charges by
the Germans, were substantiated in part by evidence given out by
the Red Cross physicians, who stated that the wounds in many cases
consisted of a small round hole on the said in which the bullet
l.On Feb. 3, 1915, The Outlook Commenting on the stand taken by
the Washington Government said, wAs to the charges that the
United States ought to, but did not, suppress the sale of dum
dum bullets to Great Britain, it is shown that whenever charges
have been made thorough investigation has followed at the fac-
tories, and that no evidence of such sale was forthcoming nor
has since been produced by the persons making the charges, al-
though the records of the manufacturers were laid before them.
"

entered, but a badly torn and lacerated opening on the side from
which it emerged. As suggested earlier, the description of
the wounds thus produced conforms nearly, if not entirely with
that of the wounds produced by the so-called M dum-dum n bullet,
the use of which is contrary to international agreement, as
reached in the Hague Conference of 1899. 2 In view of the fact
that the United States did not sign this declaration, it is not
binding upon this country to enforce it; however, since the
American delegates were instructed to favor a more inclusive
proposition at that time, 3 President Wilson felt the United
States Government might stand by the Hague declaration because
it has the same ultimate purpose in view; namely, the ameliora-
tion of • suffering,
The investigations cited above preclude any chance that
the dum-dum bullets were being furnished by American manufactur-
ers. Further investigations revealed the fast that none of the
belligerent governments were furnishing their armies with dum
dums. It may be the French complaint was well founded, however,
as it is known they were fighting a contingent from Saxony4 at
the time they suffered the most severe wounds, the results of
which caused them to protest to the United States.
The Scientific American^ published the following statement
pertaining to dum-dum bullets:— "It will be appreciated that, as
in the Indian campaign, the bullet can be easily prepared by any
3. Declaration III.
3. Higgins - - The Hague Peace Conference, p. 496.
4. It is well known that the people in this part of the German
Empire hunt a great deal; also that soft nosed bullets are
very extensively used for big game. It is at least possible
that the Saxons may have used 3ome private ammunition against
the French in battle.
5. October 3, 1914.

soldier individually, without the knowledge of his superiors;
and if such bullets have been used in the present war, this is
their undoubted source. In view of the established facts in
relation to wounds made by modern bullets, there is little object
or reason for any government intentionally supplying this form
of ammunition, n
This last point was emphasized still more a week later in
a quotation from the Medical Record of New York,— "Dum-dums are
not used in the present war, but a legitimate substitute (refer-
ring to the Spitz bullet) is used, which is just as bad. This
bullet is quite short, of conical shape, tapering gradually so
that the center of gravity is thrown back near thebase; conse-
quently, • in spite of its great intitial velocity and flat pro-
tectory, it has a tendency to turn sideways upon meeting any
obstacle, although it will go through the soft parts, making a
small clean-cut channel, and do little or no injury unless it
hits a vital organ. The wounds it produces are very much lacer-
ated and otherwise attended with destructuve affects which are
not unlike the wounds inflicted by dum-dum^ bullets There
is no occasion to use dum-dums, for the Spitz bullet is almost
as destructive, and its employment is just as brutal. "6
Finally, in an elaborate article based upon careful obser-
vation and scientific experiment, Mr. E. C. Crossman draws the
following conclusions,— "There is very little evidence that use
has been made of expanding bullet3 in the present war. Any ex-
ceedingly large wounds apparing to be caused by dum-dums may have
been caused by a sharp-point bullet in its original tumbling act.
6. The Literary Digest
;
October 10, 1914, p. 681.

The regular army Spitzer bullet as used by the British, French,
and Belgians, is more deadly than the soft nose or dum-dum. They
weigh less, but take a staggering, tumbling, spinning course
through the flesh, causing a ripping, tearing wound. The
a
German Mauser bullet makes a clear-cut hole in the flesh, 1"
This, no doubt, accounts for the fact that the Germans have made
more complaints than the Anglo-French allies.
In the light of all its evidence, we would conclude that
while no false reports were purposely given out, there is no
reason to think that any government is furnishing its army with
dum-dum bullets, and the United States, by its active investiga-
tion of the matter, has manifested a desire to assist in maintain-
ing international agreements for the benefit of humanity and
also to maintain neutrality in spirit by suppressing the export
of ammunition which is contrary to those agreements.
7 « Scientific American; April 17, 1S15, p. 358.

61
Chapter VI
TREATMENT OF ARMED MERCHANTMEN IN AMERICAN PORTS
The status of armed merchantmen has given rise to much
discussion in this country, both in Congress end in the Press
and has been the subject of prolonged diplomatic controversy.
Great Eritain anticipating difficulty as early as August 8, 1914
directed the British Charg'e d'Affaires to deliver a note to
the Secretary of State calling attention to the fact that Great
Britain and Germany held different opinions as to the right of
converting merchantment into auxiliary warships on the high seas.
This note was the fore-runner of an avalanche of diplomatic cor-
respondence which revealed the fact that the principal opposing
belligerents differed in respect to the status of merchantmen,
which were not converted into warships but which were armed for
8 elf-defense.
Being concerned only with questions of American neutrality;
we need not consider the merits of the controversy regarding sub-
marine warfare as carried on against enemy and neutral commerce;
neither are we concerned with the McLemore or Gore Resolutions
introduced in the House and Senate respectively warning American
citizens from traveling on armed belligerent merchantmen.
These are incidental questions and readily r esolve themselves in'
tc matters of state policy. The real question which bears upon
neutrality is whether belligerent merchantmen mounting guns are
entitled to the hospitality of neutral ports such as is enjoyed
by unarmed merchant vessels, or whether they should be treated
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as ordinary men-of-war. It will Toe necessary then to define the
action which the United States has taken to compare this policy
with the theory and practice of the past.
If the contention be admitted that merchantmen may carry
some armament (for self-defense) then we need not consider the
question of conversion at all. On the other hand if we take the
view that a merchantship becomes a man-of-war , within the meaning
of the Hague Convention immediately upon mounting any arms for
any purpose whatsoever, then we should be concerned in considering
the circumstances of time and place in which the armament was
mounted.
Assuming, however, as the United States Government has,
that there may legally be armed merchantmen, the place or time of
mounting the armament makes no different. All that is required
is that the ships conduct themselves in a manner prescribed by
the usage of nations for such armed merchantmen . The German
Government denies that there can technically or /egally be such
a thing as an armed merchant vessel. In other words, it recog-
nizes no distinction between a merchant vessel armed for defense
only and a merchant vessel converted into an auxiallary warship.
This was clearly brought out in a memorandum from the German
Foreign Office, to Ambassador Gerard,-^ under date of October 15,
1914, in which it was said, "If the Government of the United
l.From Supplement of American Journal of International Law -
July lS15,p. 338. The note said: "The equipment of British
merchant vessels with artillery is for the purpose of making
armed resistance against German cruisers. Resistance of this
sort is contrary to international law, because in a military
sense a oe r chant vessel is not permitted to defend itself against
a war vessel. It is a question whether or not ships thus armed
should be admitted into ports of a neutral country at all. Such
ships, in any event, shculd not receive any better treatment in
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States considers that it fulfills its duty as a neutral nation by
confining the admission of armed merchant ships as are equipped
for defensive purposes only, it is pointed out that so far as de-
termining the warlike character of a ship is concerned, the dis-
tinction between the defensive and offensive is irrelevant. The
destination of a ship for use of any kind in war is conclusive, and
the restrictions as to the extent of armament afford no guarantee
that ships armed for defensive purposes only will not be used for
offensive purposes under certain circumstances. n
To this memorandum, Acting-Secretary Lansing replied at
some length, restating the position taken by the United States in
the instructions issued by the State Department on September 15,
1914. He called attention to the fact that the practice of a
majority of nations and the consensus of opinion by the leading
authorities on international law, including many German writers,
supported the proposition that merchant vessels ms.y arm for defense
without losing their private character and that they may employ
such armament against hostile attack without contravening the prin-
ciples of international law. He went on to point out that the
purpose of an armament is to be determined by various circumstances:
"This Government considers that in permitting a private vessel hav-
ing a general cargo, a customary amount of fuel, an average crew,
and passengers of both sexes on board, and carrying a small arma-
ment and small amount of ammunition, to enjoy the hospitality of an
American port as a merchant vessel, it is in no way violating its
neutral ports than a regular warship, and should be subject at
least to the rules issued by neutral nations restricting the
stay of a warship."
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'duty as a neutral.
In view of the divergence of opinion on this point, it is
submitted that the view, of the neutral should prevail, providing
there is reasonable ground for its claim. For if the neutral
should adopt the views of one belligerent the opposing belligerent
might have some grounds for complaint, especially, if the change
of policy worked a hardship on the latter. It is necessary,
therefore, that we should determine what has been the American
practice in the past. It will be interesting to call attention
also in passing, to the practice of each of the belligerents, be -
fore the present war, in respect to the status of armed merchant-
men. Inasmuch as the belligerents hold different views as to
the status of merchant ships mounting armament, it is evident
that if the United States departs from its customary practice
the presumption, at least, will be that the reason for doing so
was to prejudice either one side or the other in the conflict.
We find that the practice of nations generally, has been
to allow merchant ships to carry arms for self-defense. To quote
Mr. A. Pearce Higgina,^ "The right of a merchant ship to defend
herself, and to be armed for that purpose, has not, so far as I
am aware, been doubted for two centuries, until the question has
again become one of practical importance. The historical evidence
of the practice down to the year 1815 is overwhelming. n He goes
on to point out that Dr. Schramm, in his elaborate denial of the
right, fails to distinguish between the position in which a belli-
ent warship stands to an enemy merchant ship, and that in which
2. Supplement, American Journal of International Law; July, 1915;
pp. 338-240.
3. American Journal of International Law, October 1914; an article
entitled Armed Merchant Ships; pp. 705-32.

it stands to a neutral merchant ship.
4
Senator Lodge in a recent speech in the Senate^ showed
that the practice of ships engaged primarily in trade, out carry-
ing armament for their own defense, goes back to a very remote per-
iod. He suggests the probable reason for introducing the practice
was to provide protection against pirates on the high seas, and
barbarians on the shores cf distant lands.. As time went on, pir-
acy disappeared, but privateering in time of war made it neces-
sary for merchantmen to sail under convoy. It was in part to
avoid the necessity of convoy that ship3 were permitted to arm.
Not only were belligerent merchant ships permitted to arm, but in
Great Britain, as late as the eighteenth century, orders were is-
sued making it compulsory for them to do so. Thus the practice
became primarily for protection against capture by the forces of
the enemy. It was so generally recognized as late as 1815, that
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Nereide
,
said, n In point
of fact, it is believed that a belligerent merchant vessel rarely
sails unarmed, n
There is no evidence to show that the practice of arming mer-
chant vessels has been discontinued. Privateering wa3 formally
abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856; not all the nations
ratified the treaty but principally for the reason that it did not
4. Schramm-Das Pr i 3 e nr_ech_t in seiner neusten Gestalt : "The belli-
gerent acts in the exercise of the right of visit and search and
of seizure with recognized, lawful authority * *. Accordingly,
the merchant vessel ha3 to suffer this encroachment by the belli-
gerent; an act of defense on the part of the merchant ship would
constitute an encroachment upon the legal rights of the belli-
gerent. This applies to neutral as well as to enemy merchant
ships. The latter have no exceptional status. They do not
possess the right of self-defense. (Translated by T. H. Theis-
ing, Legislative Divsion; p. 309J.
5
.
February 18, 1916.
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include more extensive reforms. 6 This Conference, however, did
not abolish the right of a merchant ship to carry arms, even though
it formally abolished one of the evils, for the protection against
which merchant ships had been allowed to arm. As a matter of fact,
privateering had largely ceased to exist before the Declaration of
Paris, and the right of a merchant ship to resist capture by enemy
cruisers was quite as well established.
The United States steadily maintained the right of merchant-
men to carry arms under certain conditions which will be enumerated
later. There have not been many court decisions since the Nerdide,
on which to base this statement. In the case of the Panama in
18S9, Justice Gray in rendering the judgment remarked: "Yet it
must be admitted that arms and ammunition are not contraband of war,
when taken and kept on board a merchant vessel as part of her equip-
ment, and solely for her defense against "enemies, pirates, and
assailing thieves," according to the ancient phrase still retained
in policies of marine insurance.
"
Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries on American Law* says the
subject has many times arisen in the Supreme Court of the United
6. Notably among those not ratifying was the United States, the
representatives of which insisted upon the additional article -
Immunity of private property on the ocean from hostile capture.
(7 Moore; pp. 563-565).
7. It was established by practice and universal assent that a mer-
chantman armed only for defense did not thereby lose her charac-
ter as a merchantman and that when war existed the armed merchant
men, both of the belligerent and of the neutral, retained all
the rights ana privileges which belonged to the .merchantman when
entirely unarmed. * * There was never any doubt as to the broad
rule that a merchantman armed for defence did not lose her char-
acter a3 a peaceful trader. * Senator Lodge Speech in the Senate.
Feb. 18, »16.
8. Scott, Cases, pp. 788-7T6: Justice Gray quotes Pratt, Contraband
of war, Chapters XXII, XXV, and XL. and cites the cases of
Dutch and Spanish Ships and The Happy Couple.
S. Volume 1} pp. 95-96; He mentions the cases of Brown v. United
States, Dos Hermanos, and Amiable Isabella .

States and the doctrine cf the law ia considered to be that private
citizens cannot acquire a title of hostile property, unless seized
unaer a commission, but they may still lawfully seize hostile pro-
perty in their own defense.
in 187? Secretary of State, Fish passed upon the question of
a trading vessel armed for protection and defense, and in 18S4,
Secretary Gresham declared there were no laws violated by ships
carrying arms for self-defense. xu The United States Naval War
Code cf 1900 recognizes the right of merchant ships to resist cap-
ture. ±x
N°r is the 'practice peculiar to the United States alone. It
is recognized by the international law writer3l2 of Great Britain,
France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden and by a few German writers. In
addition to these writers we find that the Italian 'Codice per la
Marine Mercantile, 1 of 187? reads "Merchantmen, on being attacked
by other vessels, including war vessels, may defend themselves
against and even seize them."!^ Likewise, the Russian Prize Regula-
tions of 1885,14 and the Japanese Naval War Code of 1904 recognize
the right of merchant vessels to resist attack.
10. 2 Moore, Digest; p. 1070; This contains the articles of the Re-
vised Statutes pertaining to the arming of merchantmen.
11. Article lG-Paragraph 3: The personnel cf merchant vessels of an
enemy who in self-defense and in protection of the vessel placed
in their charge, resist an attack, are entitled, if captured, to
the status of prisoners of war.
12. Oppenheim, International Law; Vol. II, pp. 188-88. Boeck, De La
Propriety grivee. ennemi
, 1881; p. 245 ff. Dupuis, Droit de
guerre maritime . 1898 ; p. 121, Fiore, Diretto inter nazionale
putblico, 1891; Vol. 3; pp. 103, 745.
.
Nys, Droit International
,
Bruxelle, 1912; p. 113.
Kleen, Lois et usages de la neutrality
, 1900; p. 312 ff.
Ferguson, Manual of International Law, 1884; Vol. II; pp. 385-386
13. Article 209.
14. Article 15; - The right to stop, examine, and seize hostile or
suspected v essels and cargoes belongs to the ships of the Imper-
ial Navy. Vessels of the Mercantile Navy have a right to do
so only when they are attacked by hostile or suspected vessels.
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That the right of a merchant vessel to carry arms to resist
attack is pretty generally accepted by all the countries is attest-
ed "by the fact that the best known authorities at the meeting of
the Institute of International Law, held at Oxford in 1913 adopted
the following rule, which appears as Article 12 of the Manuel des
lois de la guerre maritime,: "Outside the conditions determined in
articles 5 and following" the public and private vessels with their
personnel may not make hostile attacks against an enemy* It is,
however, permitted that they may employ force for defense against
the attacks of an enemy's vessel." The discussion at the institute
showed there was some opposition to the second statement. Prof-
fessors Triepel and Niemeyer argued against its being inserted in
the rule. 15 The article was ultimately voted, however, with a
large majority.
In view of these facts, the contention that the right of a
merchant vessel to carry arms is obsolete, is unsound. 1 ''' The
doctrine is recognized today though the reasons for its existence
may be different from what they were originally.
Whatever the reasons may be, the rule is well established and
15. Professor Triepel desired to obtain its suppression, on the
ground that an enemy merchant ship had no righx to resist cap-
ture (as distinct from an attack), while Professor Niemeyer
supported its suppression on the ground that to insert such a
provision was equivalent to conceding that a contrary opinion
was impossible.
16. Hi^gins-Armed Merchant Ships in the American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, October 1914; pp. 705-722.
17. The right of a belligerent to visit and search neutral vessels
is wholly different from a belligerent's rights as to enemy
ships. The belligerent is permitted to visit and search a neu-
tral vessel so that he may see whether the vessel is in fact,
neutral, and whether there is on board contraband goods subject
to seizure. In the ca3e of enemy merchantmen the right to cap-
ture only exists. Such vessels may flee, or defend themselves
to the extent of their powers. - Congressional Record; March 8,
1916;pp. 4329-30.
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should not be changed by the act of one belligerent during any war
unless, because of certain radical differences arising, it should
have become notoriously inequitable. The Germans have declared
such to be the case in the present war. It will, therefore, be
necessary to consider the special circumstances which are cited by
the Germans and justifiable reasons for departing from the establish-
ed practice of nations.
The distinguishing feature between an armed merchantman and a
converted merchantman is that the former carries armament for de-
fense only; and this ia determined by fact. There are no limit-
ations**^ as to the amount of armament, or the character of the
crew. \i it be established that the vessel is engaged in commer-
cial pursuits - and does, in fact, commit no offensive acts against
the enemy it is a merchant vessel, and entitled to all the rights
and immunities of merchant vessels in neutral ports.
The German Government maintains that submarines have, by their
peculiar nature, put the armed merchantmen on the offensive. The
submarine dares not approach near enough to warn the merchantman
of its intention without being at the mercy of the latter. The
German Foreign office points out that the submarine is unable to
withstand the fire of even small guns, such as are mounted on mer-
chantmen. Furthermore, in most cases, it asserts that the merchant-
men attack before being fired upon, and in so doing, they act upon
the offensive, which virtually constitutes them warships, or even
pirates.
16. In the case of the 'Charming Betsy' (3 Cranch, 130-131), Chief
Justice Marshall said: The degree of arming which should bring
a vessel within this description has not been ascertained, and
perhaps it would be difficult precisely to make the limits,
the passing of which would bring a captured vessel within the
description of the act3 of Congress on this subject. See also:
Snow, International Law, 1888; p. 83.
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Before proceeding further, we may review the action of the
United States in respect to armed merchantmen in the present war.
On September 19, 1914 the State Department issued a circular pertain-
ing to the status of armed merchant vessels, a copy of which was
sent to each of the belligerent nations. The main points are as
follows :19
A. A Merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an
armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without
acquiring the character of a ship of war.
B. The presence of an armament and ammunition on board a
merchant vessel creates a presumption that the armament i3 for of-
fensive purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this pre-
sumption by evidence showing that the vessel carries armament solely
for defense.
C. Evidence necessary to establish the fact that the armament
will not be used offensively,*** must be presented in each case in-
dependently &t an official investigation.*** Indications to this
effect are:
(1) That the caliber of the guns carried does not exceed six inches.
(2) That the guns and small arms carried are few in number.
(3) That no guns are mounted on the forward part of the vessel.
(4) That the quantity of ammunition carried is small,
(5) That the vessel is manned by its usual crew, and the officers
are the same as those on board before war was declared.
(8) That the vessel carries passengers who are a3 a whole unfitted
to enter the military or naval service of the belligerent whose
flag the vessel flies, or any of its allies, and particularly if
19. Supplement, American journal of International Law, July 1915;
pp. 334 - 236.

the passenger list includes women and children,
(10) That the speed of the vessel ie slow.
E. The conversion of a merchant vessel into a ship of war is
a question of fact which is to be established by direct or circum-
stantial evidence of intention to use the vessel as a ship of war.
This is a brief summary of the long existent American practice.
Prior to these orders, the United States had informally requested
all the belligerent powers not to arm merchant ships destined for
American ports. On the 4th September, 1914 Sir Cecil Spring -
Rice issued the following communication to the Secretary of State
regarding tvvo British armed merchantmen in particular, and armed
merchantmen in general :20 "I have the honour to inform you that
at the request of your Department I drew the attention of my Gov-
ernment to the fact that two British merchant vessels, the Adriatic
j
and the Merrion . were at present in United States ports, and that
they were carrying guns - the former four and the latter six.***
"I have now received a reply from Sir Edward Grey, in which
he informs me that His Majesty's Government hold the view that it
is not in accordance with neutrality and international law to de-
tain in neutral ports merchant vessels armed with purely defensive
armaments. But in view of the fact that the United States Govern-
ment is detaining armed merchant vessels for offensive warfare, and
in order to avoid the difficult questions of the character and
degree of armament which would justify detention, His Majesty's
Government have made agreements for landing the gun3 of the Merrio n,
the Adriatic having already sailed before the orders reached her.
In the case of the latter ship, the passenger list and cargo proved
20. Ibid; p. 231.
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that she wa3 proceeding to sea on ordinary commercial business. I
These and other papers relative to the case will be duly communicat
ed to your Department.
"This action has been taken without prejudice to the general
principle which His Majesty's Government have enunciated and to
which they adhere.
"
For a number of weeks there were no other British armed-mer-
chantmen in American ports; however, in addition to the instruc-
tions already sent out, Secretary Lansing in hi3 reply to the Ger-
man prote3t21 said very plainly that the United States Government
recognized the right of belligerent merchant vessels to carry arms
in self-defen3e. Accordingly, when Great Gritain, later consider-
ed it necessary to arm ler merchantmen carrying American commerce,
the vessels were allowed the customary rights and privileges of
merchant ships in neutral ports, upon assurance from the British
Foreign Office that the armament was to be used for defense only„ 22
Likewise the armed Italian merchant vessels Guiseppe Verdi , Sari
21. October 15, 1914:- nThe practice of a majority of nations and
the concensus of opinion by the leading authorities on inter-
national law, including many German writers support the pro-
position that merchant vessels may arm for defense without los-
ing their private character, and that they may employ 3uch
armament against hostile attack without contravening the prin-
ciples of international law."
22. Cecil Spring-Rice to the Secretary of State; Aug. 25, 1914;
From Supplement, American Journal of International Law; July
1915; p. 230:" ** I have the honor, in view of the fact that
a number of British armed merchantmen will now be visiting
United States ports, to reiterate that the arming of British
merchantmen is solely a precautionary measure adopted for the
purpose of defence against attack from hostile craft. *** I
have at the same time been instructed by His Majesty's Princi-
pal Secretary for Foreign Affairs to give the United States
Government the fullest assurances that British merchant ves-
sels will never be used for purposes of attack, that they are
merely peaceful traders armed only for defence, that they will
never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never
under any circumstances attack any vessel."

Guglielmoj Casgrta^ Stampalia, Verona, and others upon assurance
from the Italian Ambassador in each case that the guns would be
used only for 3elf-defense , were allowed to land, discharge their
cargoes, reload, and depart. There was a great deal of newspaper
comment regarding these ships at the time, largely due to the fact
that they came within a few day3 of each other, and also because
the British and French vessels arriving at American ports had been
for most part unarmed, in accordance with the wishes of the State
Department. 23
In all cases of armed merchant vessels arriving at American
ports, the rules contained in the circular of September IS, 1914
were applied. On the fifteenth of October 1915, the State Depart-
ment received a communication from the German Foreign Office relat-
ing to this circular, which said in part:- This ruling wholly fails
to comply with the principles of neutrality. * * It is a question
whether or not ships armed to make resistance against German cruis-
ers 3hculd be admitted into port3 of a neutral country at all. "In
any event," the note continues, "Such ships should not receive any
better treatment in neutral ports than a regular warship and should
be subject at least to the rules issued by neutral nations restrict-
ing the stay of a warship. " It went cn to say, that the distinction
between defensive and offensive armement was irrelevant; The des-
23. Note to Berlin; Nov. 7, 1914; Ibid. p. 239; This Government is
not unmindful of the fact that the circumstances of a particu-
lar case may be such a3 to cause embarrassment and possible
controversy as to the character of an armed private vessel
visiting its ports. Recognizing therefore, the desirability
of avoiding a ground of complaint, this Government, as 30on as
a case arose, while frankly admitting the right of a merchant
vessel to carry a defensive armament expressed its disapprobation
of a practice which compelled it to pass upon a vessel's intended!
use, which opinion, if proved subsequently to be erroneous might
constitute a ground for a charge of unneutral conduct.
_
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tination of a ship for use of any kind in war is conclusive, and
restrictions a3 to the extent of armament afford no guarantee that
ships armed for defensive purposes only will not be used for offen-
sive purposes under certain circumstances.
It is submitted that this view may be true, but to no greater
extent than in previous wars. If the neutral country has the sol-
emn assurance that a belligerent will allow the armed merchant
vessels flying its flag to use their guns for defense only, the
neutral can do nothing further in the cause of neutrality unless
evidence appears that the promise was made in bad faith.
There were some complaints made by Germany that armed mer-
chantmen fired upon German submarines at sight - before any attempt
was made by the sumbarine to attack the merchant vessels. This,
the Germans argued, was taking the offensive, whereas the Allies
maintained that since the purpose of the submarine in the vicinity
of an enemy merchantman was to destroy, and since the Germans had
allowed them to destroy, in many cases, without notice, it is
purely a case of self-defense when the merchant vessel fires upon
the submarine before the latter has come near enough for its own
projectiles to take effect on the merchant ship.
Aside from this general disagreement the German Government
complained that British merchantmen carried secret instructions*^
24. Press Dispatch of March 6: "It is stated semi-of ficially in
German newspapers that British in3turctions have been added
to the published documents, photographic reproduction of these
instructions have been made. * * * The character of these in-
structions is shown clearly by the emphatic request to keep them
secret, as well as by the fact that regular gujiners are employed.
Numerous unprovoked attacks on German submarines prove that
these instructions have been understood perfectly by British
merchantmen. "By them it is rendered clear that the armed
British Merchant ships have official permission treacherously
to attack German submarines everywhere when they come near them:
that is, to wage war against them unscrupulously."
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to attack submarines under any and all circumstances. While there
has been much newspaper comment in regard to this charge, the fact
has not, as yet, been established. On October 21, 1915, the
British Government made public circulars of the Admiralty's Orders
to Merchantmen. These were issued early in the war to the mer-
chant marine and were revised from time to time, though they had
not been made public to the other nations. They are in the main
as follows:
"Armament is supplied solely for the purpose of resisting at-
tack by an armed enemy vessel and must not be used for any other
purpose whatever.
>
"The armament is supplied for the purpose of defense only.
The object of the master should be to avoid action whenever possible
"Experience has shown that hostile submarines and air craft
have frequently attacked merchant vessels without warning. It is
important, therefore, that craft of this description should not be
allowed to approach to short range, at which a torpedo or bomb
launched without notice would almost certainly be effective.
British and allied submarines and air craft have orders not to ap-
proach merchant vessels. Consequently it may be presumed that
any submarine or aircraft which deliberately approaches or pursues
a merchant vessel does 30 with hostile intention. In such cases
fire may be opened in self-defense in order to prevent the hostile
craft from closing to a range at which resistance to a sudden at-
tack with bomb or torpedo would be impossible.
"
Apart from the so called secret instructions, the submarine
brought up a new question with respect to armed merchant vessels.
By self-defense it had usually been understood that a ship should
not fire unless ordered to stop or was itself fired upon. Obvious-
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ly if a merchantman should wait until a submarine had approached
near enough and discharged a torpedo it would be too late to offer
resistance. It was in view of this and other difficulties that
Secretary Lansing sought to avoid difficulty by seeking to have
the belligerents adopt a compromise agreement^ - the main points
being the guarantee of humane treatment of belligerent merchant-
men by Germany and the giving up of armaments on merchant vessels
by the Allies.
The conditions of Secretary Lansing's proposal^ were:-
1. A noncombatant has the right to traverse the high seas in a
merchant ship entitled to fly a belligerent flag, and rely upon
the rules if international law and the principles of humanity if
the vessel is approached by a belligerent war vessel.
2. A merchant vessel of any nationality should not be subject to
attack until the belligerent warship has warned her to stop.
3. Any belligerent-owned merchant vessel should promptly obey any
order from a belligerent warship to stop.
4. No such merchant vessel should be fired upon unless she tries
to flee or to resist by force and even in such cases any attack
upon her by the warship must stop as soon as the flight or resis-
tance ceases.
5. Only in case it should be impossible for military reasons for
the warship to supply a prize crew or to convoy the merchant ship
into port will she be justified in sinking such merchantman, and
in that case passengers and crew must be removed to a place of
safety.
35. Note of Jan. 18, 1916.
26. The Secretary explained that the proposal was not submitted
for the purpose of changing recognized, or even challenged
principles cf international law, but that the subject had

On March 1, 1916 the German Government practically agreed to
the terms of the proposal, subject to like agreement thereto by
her enemies. The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
on that . iay addressed a communication to the American Ambassador
in which it was said, "It is in accordance with Germany's wishes
also to have maritime war conducted according to rules, which
without discriminated restricting one or the other of the belli-
gerent powers in the use of their means of warfare are equally
considerate of the interests of neutrals and the dictates of human-
ity. Proceeding from this view, the German Government have care-
fully examined the suggestion of the American Government and be-
lieve that they can actually see in it a suitable basis for the
practical solution of the questions which have arisen."
By the twenty-fourth of the same month all the Entente Powers
through their embassies had handed Secretary Lansing formal re-
sponses uniformly rejecting this proposal, as they had indicated
their Governments would do when the tentative plan was first is-
sued. They gave as their reasons that the 'compromise 1 wa3 vir-
tually a case of giving up a well founded right, namely to arm
merchantmen in self-defense, in return for nothing more than the
assurance that their enemy would abide by the long established
duties imposed by international law in maritime warfare.
It was understood that the proposal was not intended to alter
established laws nor to establish doubtful rules of conduct. 2?
been taken up wholly on humanitarian grounds, and because
the Wilson Administration was anxious that something 3hould
be done to avoid embarrassing controversies which seemed
inevitable unless some such arrangement could be made.
27. From Extension of Remarks by Representative Decker, March 8,
lS16-Congres3ional Record; p. 4335: A portion of the Secre-
tary 'a note: "In proposing this formula as a basis of condition 1
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It was made on the grounds of humanity and with a desire on the
part of the United States to bring the belligerents to an equitable
agreement in regard to a practice, which by a series of retalia-
tory measures had endangered noncornbatant, and even neutral, lives
on the high seas. Nevertheless, in the course of the argument,
the Secretary used some unhappy expressions, which have since
been bitterly attacked in Congress and in the press. Because
of its admirable summary of the effect of changed conditions on
existing laws, we may quote his remarks:
"Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against enemy
commerce of the' high seas had been conducted with cruisers carry-
ing heavy armaments. In these conditions international law ap-
peared t.o permit a merchant vessel to carry armament for defensive
purposes without losing its character as a private merchant ves-
n
sel. This right seems to have been predicated on the superior de-
fensive strength of ships of war, and the limitation of armament
to have been dependent on the fact that it could not be used ef-
fectively in offense against enemy naval vessels, while it could
defend the merchantmen against the generally inferior armament of
piratical ships and privateers. The use of the submarine however,
has changed these relations. Comparison of the defensive strength
of a cruiser and a submarine shows that the latter, relying for
protection on its power to submerge, is almost defenseless in point
of construction. Even a merchant ship carrying a small calibre
gun would be able to use it effectively for offense against the
submarine.
al declarations by the belligerent Governments, I do so in the
full conviction that each Government wi^l consider primarily the
humane purposes of saving the lives of innocent people rather than
the insistence of doubtful legal rights which may be denied on ac-
count of new conditions.. , «.
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"Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the
main channels of the sea and privateering has been abolished.
Consequently the placing of guns on merchantmen at the present
date of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of
a purpose to render merchant men superior in force to submarines
and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. Any arma-
ment therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the char-
acter of an offensive armament.
"It would therefore appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally
just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belliger-
ents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the
rules of international law in the matter of stopping and search-
ing merchant vessels, removing crews and passengers to places of
safety,*** and the merchant vessels of belligerent nationality
should be prohibited from carrying any armament whatsoever. "2b
In conclusion the Secretary said, "I shall add that my Govern-
ment is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a
merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the
character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of
the undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiallary cruiser
and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent Govern-
ment, and my Government is seriously considering notifying its
officials accordingly."
In regard to this last paragraph, Senator Sterling in a speech
on February 18, 1916 said, "This paragraph from the memorandum
suggests a dangerous and vicious principle. Without reference
28. Taken from the Congressional Record; March 8, 1916; pp.
444? - 4448.

to any nation here involved the proposal therein contained would
subordinate one of the contending powers to the interests of that
nation whose strength on the high seas lay in the superiority of
her submarine fleet. Under the operation of this principle the
legitimate commerce of half a dozen other opposing nations a3 be-
tween themselves as well as their commerce with neutral nations
carried in enemy merchantmen might if wholly defenseless be made
the easy prey of that power which wgs superior in submarine
strength and which chose to be remorseless in its use.2^
Senator Lodge was opposed to it or. the ground that it was in-
equitable and would amount in fact to changing during the progress
of the war an existing practice of the United States, and what is
pretty generally considered to be a law of nations. Such a pro-
cedure was strongly opposed by the United States Government dur-
ing the munitions controversy. President Wilson, in a letter to
Senator Stone, reiterate that it was not a case of changing a law,
or even a custom, for, said he, "No nation, nor group of nations
has the right while war is in progress to alter or disregard the
principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of
the horrors and sufferings of war.
"
The Nation^ commenting editorially remarked, that to follow
out the last paragraph of Secretary Lansing's memorandum would
"reverse a ruling cf the State Department deliberately made since
the war broke out. " Each time the matter has come up it has
been decided in the same way. Furthermore, since the State
Department was not satisfied with the Eritish plea, in regard to
39. Congressional Record; p. 3182.
30. Feb. 17, 1916; p. 183.
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departure from the recognized rules of search and blockade, of
•changed conditions/' the Department should not be willing to
grant the assertion by Germany that the coming of the submarine
had nullified the old supreme commands of humanity at sea.
It would appear that rather than alter long standing rules of
international law and practice to accommodate a new instrument
of warfare - that the submarine itself should be compelled to
observe the old rules or withdraw from the scene of action. 31
The weakness of the suggestion of the State Department lies in
this; that because the deadly submarine is not strong on defense,
you must therefore make the merchant ship absolutely helpless
against it.
In conclusion, i t appears that, with the exception of the un-
fortunate paragraph above considered, the policy of the United
States Government has been consistent in the present war with
its practice in the past. We must not overlook the fact that
thi3 paragraph was a part of a rejected proposal, and does not
in any way bind the Government now; the harm lies in the fact,
that it showed a near acquiesence of the Government in the Ger-
man submarine policy.
Upon the rejection of this proposal, the United States Govern-
ment had to rely solely upon international law, in dealing with
the question of armed merchantmen. Accordingly, Secretary Lan-
sing compiled a circular notice, 32 designed to cover the new
situations arising in the present war. This circular is thorough
ly in agreement with that of September 19, 1914, but it is more
31, See the Outlook - February 9, 1916.
32. This circular bears the date of March 25, 1S16 although it
was not made public until April 27, 1916.
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specific. Aftsr stating that it is necessary for a neutral
Government to determine the status of an armed merchant vessel
of belligerent nationality which enters its jurisdiction, in or-
der that the Government may protect itself from responsibility
for the destruction of life and property by permitting its ports
to be used as bases of hostile operations by belligerent warships,
the note says:
nA neutral Government has no opportunity to determine the pur-
pose of an armament on a merchant vessel unless there is evidence
in the 3hips papers or other proof as to its previous use, so that
the Government is justified in substituting an arbitrary rule of
persumpticn in arriving at the status of the merchant vessel.
On the other hand, a belligerent warship can cn the high seas
test by actual experience the purpose of an armament on an enemy
merchant vessel, and so determine by direct evidence the status
of the vessel. * * * In brief, a neutral Government may proceed
upon the presumption that an armed merchant vessel of belligerent
nationality is armed for agression, while a belligerent 3hould pro
ceed on the presumption that the vessel is armed for protection.
Both of these presumptions may be overcome by evidence - the
first by secondary or collateral evidence, since the fact to be
established is negative in character; the second by primary and
direct evidence, since the fact tc be established is positive in
character.
"
It was also stated in the note of March 25, that vessels carry-
ing merchandise but acting under orders from the government to
take the aggressive would be considered as warships; likewise,
ships engaged intermittently in commerce and under a commission
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of its government possess a status tainted with a hostile purpose
which it cannot throw aside; and these should be treated as war-
ships.
The Government has endeavored and obtained assurances from the
belligerent Governments that their armed merchant ships were
armed for defensive purposes only and it has carefully investi-
gated all charges of violations of the promises thus made. It
has consistently abided by the practice of the past in regard to
the treatment of armed merchant vessels, in neutral ports and
is not guilty of breach of neutrality with respect to them.
Whether, or not the existing practice is in accordance with pre-
sent day ideals, and should be changed does not affect the applica-
tion of* them so long a3 they remain in force.
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Chapter VII.
INTERNMENT OF BELLIGERENT WARSHIPS AND PRIZES IN AMERICAN PORTS.
I
During the present war as in the Russo-Japanese War a great
many belligerent warships sought refuge in neutral waters, and
many of these were eventually interned. There have also been
some instances of Prize Ships being taken into neutral ports.
In this chapter a study of the more important cases involving such
internments in American waters will be made in the light of the
law and' practice of the United States in the past.
The general principle of interment of belligerent warships in
neutral waters is analogous to that of internment of belligerent
troops in neutral territory. There are, of course, some differ-
ences in the practices in the two cases which will be brought
out later. We are first impressed by the lack of precedents in
the practice of internment of warships. This practice came into
existence for the first time, on a considerable scale during the
Russo-Japanese War in 1904.2
The late adoption of this principle in maritime warfare is no
doubt due to the increased feeling of responsibility on the part
of neutral countries^ to aid neither = ide in the conflict; direct-
ly or indirectly. It was felt that to allow a warship to seek
1. Takahashi, International Law as applied to the Russo-Japanese
War; pp. 4176*18, He presents a list of thirty Russian war ves-
sels which were interned in neutral ports during the war.
2. American Journal of International Law; Vol. IX, April 1915, p. 481;
3. Hall, International Law; 6 Ed. pp. 622-623.

safety in a neutral port from the attack of an enemy was in fact
rendering effective aid. The attacking vessel might remain just
off the port an indefinite time awaiting the enemy to leave port,
but the vessel "being under no obligation to leave would remain
in safety until the way of escape seemed clear, at which time
it would be free to sail out and engage in active hostilities.
It was the manifest inequality arising from such treatment of
belligerent warships in neutral ports which caused the principle
internment tc be invoked during the recent war between Russia
and Japan. In this war much of the fighting took place on the
sea. It very soon became evident to the neutrals controlling
ports within easy reach of the theatre of operations that 3ome
entering them, otherwise they would be open to the charge of
breach of neutrality for allowing their ports to become naval
bases for one or the other of the belligerents. Thus the action
of France, Great Eritain, Germany, and the United States in caus-
ing certain unseaworthy Russian ships to intern within a reason-
able time after arriving in fchefrespective ports was sanctioned
by the other countries of the world, and the principle, which
had long existed in the theorectical sense, came to be recognized
as an important feature of modern warfare.*
The fact that there is a difference between the tieatment of
warships and armies^ is due to the difference in the methods of
carrying on hostilities on land and on sea. It is permissible
for belligerent warships to run into neutral ports of their own
accord, to avoid a storm or even to escape an enemy. While in
4. Naval War College - International Law Topics, 1S05; p. 162.
5. Oppenheim International Law II; p. 374.
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the port she may make certain repairs needed to render her sea-
worthy, or she may take on coal, or even provisions for her crew,
in sufficient quantities to enable her to make the nearest home
port or a certain designated neutral port. Having accomplished
her purpose she may put to sea and resume her belligerent activi-
ties. This, in contrast to the strict ruling that an army cross-
ing a neutral boundary under stress of danger is required to be
interned by the neutral government, whose territory it ha3 invaded
There are many and varied conditions which must be taken into
consideration in either case. It must be borne in mind that
while the general principles are universally recognized, the
nations differ with regard to many of the details. It will be
sufficient for our purpose to consider the American practice and
also to study the compromised agreement reached at the Hague
Conference in 1907 pertaining to internment of belligerent war
vessels.
During the Russo-Japanese War one Russian cruiser was interned
in San Francisco harbor and a number of other? were similarly
detained in the port of Manila until the close of the war. The
Cruiser Lena, early in the war, sailed into San Francisco in an
unseaworthy condition. Although the bad condition of the vessel
was not due to any hostile action, nevertheless the port authori-
ties, upon examination, felt that the extent of the repairs needed
to make the ship ready for the sea would be sufficiently great to
constitute a case of 'fitting out a war vessel in a neutral port."
The Secretary of War by authority of the President , therefore,
ordered the ship to intern.
In all other cases, so far as the records show, the ships were
allowed to repair 3uch damages a3 were caused by the elements,

as distinct from those inflicted toy the enemy. Thus, in the
case of the Russian squadron under Admiral Enquist which sailed
into Manila, the President directed that a strict enforcement
of the twenty-four hour stay toe applied in view of the fact that
damages to the ship3 were due to the acts of the enemy in battle
and not to the action of the elements or to accidents. It was
maintained toy the Government at Washington that to allow vessels
injured in battle to refit in a neutral port would practically
make the neutral port a naval base for the belligerent.
The plan of limiting the stay of a warship in a neutral hartoor
was first adopted toy Great Eritain in 1861 as a result of diffi-
culties arising when a Confederate and a Federal cruiser were
lying in a British port at the same time.? Until then there had
been no restriction as to the length of time a belligerent war-
ship might remain in neutral ports. Indeed, France has not as
yet 3een fit to limit the stay of such vessels in ports under
her jurisdiction. Commander Vcn TIslar of the German Navy thinks
the United States exceeded its measure of duty in the ca3e of the
Russian squadron in Manila.** He advocated a compromise agree-
6. Naval War College - International Law Topics and Discussions,
1S05; p. 168. See Telegram of June 5, 1905 of the Secretary of
War to the Governor of the Philippine Islands.
7. Hall, International Law, 6 Ed, p. 625.
8. Naval War College-International Law Situations; 1S05; p. 169:
He says, "The old rules of neutrality do not restrict the 3tay
of the ships of belligerents in any respect more than in times
of peace. They permit all articles of equipment to be supplied
and any repairs to be made that do not immediately contribute
to enhance thefighting capabilities. The new principle ad-
vanced by England in 1861, was accepted first by the United
States and later by many other countries, limits the duration
of the stay to 24 hours, and permits sufficient coal to be tak-
en on board to enable the vessel to reach the nearest port of
her own country, or some nearer destination and repairs to
restore sea worthiness. " The German delegation upheld a sim-
ilar proposition at the Hague Conference in 1907 (Hershey,
Essentials of International Law; p. 470.
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ment which would apply 4 the twenty-four hour ruling when the
ports are near the sphere of operation of the hostile fleets, but
would apply the French rules in case of a great distance. Such
a rule might easily operate to the disadvantage of one nation.
For example, had the rule been applied in the Russo-Japanese War
by the United States the Lena would have been allowed to engage in
hostilities again after having been protected for a number of
months in a neutral port while undergoing repairs. With regard
to the squadron in the Philippine Islands the question would
arise whether the port of Manila was far enough distant to come
under the French ruling. While the same treatment in all cases
may occasionally be inequitable, it seems to be more desirable
from the standpoint of the neutral than any compromise, or "slid-
ing-scale' rule such as the German Admiral suggested,
•
The United States haa therefore adopted the twenty-four hour
limit? allowing the captain reasonable time to make repairs on
the ship, although not to repair or render more effective its
armament. The American authorities at the port recommend the
amount of time the ship be allowed, after having made a thorough
examination of the condition of the ship. Upon the expiration
of this time, the ship is given the customary twenty-four hours
S. Naval War College; 1S05, p. 154.
3. Convention XIII, Article 13 of Hague Convention:- In default of
special provisions to the contrary in the legislation of a new
tral power, belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in the
ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power for
more than twenty-four hours, except in the cases covered by
the present Convetion.
The principle underlying the rule\Ls that a belligerent armed
vessel should not be permitted to remain in a neutral port long'
er than is absolutely necessary in order to procure innocent
supplies or to effect repairs requisite for insuring seaworthi-
ness. See Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law,
p. 470.
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in which to leave. Failing to do this it is interned.
In the present war the first warship to intern was the German
cruiser Ge i r which entered Honolulu on October 15, 1914. The ship
was in very bad condition and the commander asked for a week in
which to repair. On October 20 the American Naval Constructor
upon examination recommended that the time be extended eight
more days to place the boilers in seaworthy condition. On the
twenty-seventh the German Consul at Honolulu requested eight or
ten day3 more in which to make additional repairs, which further
inspection haa found to be necessary. The collector of customs
immediately cabled the Treasury Department for instructions.^
The Counselor of the State Department instructed the authorities
to notify the Captain of the Geir that three weeks from the time
of entering the port would be allowed the Geir for repairs. If
3he was yet unfit to leave American waters by November 6, the
United States would feel obliged to insist that she be interned
until the expiration of the war. 10 At the expiration of the
given time the Captain, feeling that his ship was still unsea-
worthy, interned November 8, 1914.
Vigorous protests were made by Germany witfc respect to two
of the officers, together with their orderlies, who had been
granted sick leave and had left Honolulu two days before the
Counselor of the State Department announced the action which the
3. Diplomatic Correspondence-European War, No. 2; pp. 49-50.'
10. European War, No. 2, Op. Cit. p.. 50: In a note to the German
Ambassador of Oct. 30, 1914 Counselor Lansing explained that
"the circumstances in this case point to the gunooat Geir as
a ship that at the outbreak of war finds itself in a more or
less broken-down condition and on the point of undergoing gen-
eral repairs, but still able to keep the sea. In this situa-
tion, the Government believes that it does not comport with a
strict neutrality, or a fair interpretation of the Hague Con-
vention, to allow such a vessel to complete unlimited repairs

United States would take in the matter. These men had embarked 11Q
ftnffed States, where they were detained as a part of the crew of
the interned cruiser. The German Ambassador argued that since
these officers and men had left Honolulu before theofficial notifi-
cation of internment that they did not in fact belong to the
company of a ship on the point of being interned; ana should
therefore be allowed to travel freely in the United States.
Mr. Lansing denied them this privilege. He pointed out that
these officers and men were not only 'duly incorporated in the
armed forces of a belligerent power' but were also in a 3nese a
'part of an organized body of such forces entering a neutral port.
The fact that they were granted a 3ick leave by the Caption could
not, he said,' be properly urged as separating them from the Geir
in relation to its subsequent treatment. "They arrived within
United States' jurisdiction as a part of the organized armed
force of the German Empire, and this fact," 3aid Mr. Lansing,"
in the opinion of this Government, appears to be the crux of the
whole matter.
In general the crew of an interned warship 1 ^ is detained just
as the members of an interned army. This has been the practice
of the United States, and the German Ambassador in his note of
November 11, 1914,^ states the same view. There can, in fact,
in a United States port.
11. Ibid; p. 52.
12. European War. No. 3; 53: - Mr. Lansing pointed out that were
a distinction made on the grounds set forth in the German note
a 6hip in danger from her enemy might enter a neutral port,
and before the twenty-four hour period had elapsed, and be-
fore there was any danger of internment, her officers and crew
might leave her and afterwards claim the right to return to
their country as individuals. This course, he said, would
manifestly not comport with the principles of neutrality as
they are understood by the Department.
13. Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix Vol. I, p. 32?;
Speech by M. Renault.
14. European War No. 2;- p. 52.
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be no other view of the situation. Of course, by permission of
the enemy, either as an act of comity or as an exchange agreement,
the neutral pay permit interned crews to return to their home
country. 15 But it is a fundamental rule that the Neutral may
not, of its own accord, permit interned crews or portions of them
to leave it3 territory.
On the day following the arrival of the Geier } the Locksun. a
German steamer belonging to the Norddeutacher-Lloyd Go. and carry-
ing a cargo of coal put into Honolulu harbor. Upon protests by
the British and Japanese Ambassadors under date of October 38,
an investigation was made which disclosed the f ; ct that the
Locksun had constituted herself a tender to the Geier . On Novem-
ber 7, therefore, the State Department notified the German
Ambassador that arrangements had been made to intern the Lock3un
unless she left the port i (mediately. 10 The ship was accordingly
interned as an auxiliary war vessel.
The German Ambassador entered a protest against this action;
he did not deny that the Locksun had furnished coal to the Geier
,
but he said the United States' Neutrality laws allowed this under
the circumstances of the present case, and that the vessel should
therefore retain its innocent character. He said, "The Locksun
cannot be considered as a man-of-war, not even an auxiliary ship,
but is a 3imple merchant ship. As tc the alleged coaling of His
Majesty's Ship Geier from the Locksun the neutrality regulations
of the United States only provide that a vessel can be prevented
15. In a few cases during the Russo-Japanese War certain officers
of the Renault interned Russian vessels were given permission
by the Japanese Government to return home (See Moore, Dig est,
Vol. VII, p. 995).
16. European War, No. 3; p. 51.

from taking coal to a warship for a period of three months after
having left an American port. As the Lccksun left the last
American port (Manila) on August 16 she ought to be free on Nov. 16
Mr. Lansing replied that the question involved did not relate
to the amount of coal which either the Lccksun or the Geier had
taken on in three months but rather related to the association
and cooperation of the two vessels in belligerent operations.
He argued that in so far as the Locksun had taken the part of a
supply ship for the Geier it was 'stamped with the belligerent
character of that vessel, and has really become a part of her
equipment. fl7
The German Ambassador-1- likened the case of the Locksun to
that of -the tug F. B. Dalzell, which he had reported to the State
Department on Oct. 31 as carrying victuals and information to the
British warship Essex from the port of New York. There were two
great differences in the cases however as Secretary Bryan pointed
out in his reply of December 11, 1914.
^
b In the first place, a
thorough investigation conducted by the American authorities
failed to reveal any evidence that the F. B. Dalzell had carried
the victuals and information, as alleged by the German Ambassador,
and secondly the latter being an American vessel could not be
subject to internment as that term is understood in international
law.
VT, European War. No. 2; p. 52~ See also N^te to German Ambassador
(p. 54) in which Mr. Bryan calls attention to a ruling made
by the Alabama Claims Commission, "So far as relates to the
Tuscaloosa (tender to the Alabama ) , the Clarence, the Tacony ,
and the Archer (tenders\to the Florida ) the Tribunal is unani-
mously of the opinion that such tenders or auxiliary vessels,
being properly regarded as accessories, must neces3'..r ily fol-
low the lot of their principals and be submitted to the same
decisions wlr ch apply to them respectively.
18. Ibid, p. 53; Ifcte to the Secretary of State, November 31.
IS. Ibid, p. 54.

We may next consider the case of the Cormoran. There appears
to have been no questions arising in connection with this vessel
as it asked immediately upon arrival for permission to intern.
The Cormoran is a German converted crusier which had on board 33
officers and 355 men when it arrived, at Guam, Dec. 14, 1914.
Permission having been granted by the United States Government
the ship interned the following day. So
On March 10, 1915, the German converted crusier Prinz Eite.l
Fr iedr ich entered the port of Newport News, Virginia, for provisions
and repairs. The United States Naval authorities made examina-
tion on the eighteenth and reported that it would require 14 work-
in? days to repair the ship. Thereupon the State Department
notified the German Government, and also took step3 to notify the
Captain that the Prinz Eitel Friedrich would be allowed until
midnight of the close of the sixth day of April to complete her
repairs. If she did not leave the territorial waters of the
United States within the following twenty-four hours, she would
be under the necessity of accepting internment under American
jurisdiction during the continuance of the war.3x The ship was
accordinaly interned April 7, 1915.
On April 11, 1915, the German auxiliary crusier Kroner in
z
Wilhelm arrived at Newport News. The following day, Ambassador
Bernstorff asked the State Department to allow the ship to land
61 persons belonging to the crews of enemy vessels sunk by her.
He al30 a3ked for permission to make repairs and to take on sup-
plies of coal and provisions. In this case Acting Secretary Lan-
30. American Journal of International Law; Vo^. IX, April, 1915,
p. 486.
21. European War No. 2; Op. Cit. p. 135. See also Law N otes
.
May 1915; p. 38.

— — — —'—-—
Bing reported22 that the United States Naval authorities estimated
it would require six working days tc put the ship in seaworthy
condition. The Government would therefore allow the Kronprinz
Wilhelm until midnight of April 29 tc repair , tut she must leave
the territorial waters of the United States within twenty- four
hours thereafter or intern. It was specifically stated that the
proposed repairs allowed the ship in Newport News v.ould not cover
the damages to the port side of the cruiser incident to the
service in which the vessel had been engaged,
in the case of these two last mentioned ship3 the officers
were given permission by the port authorities to go ashore, under
certain specified restrictions, and likewise the privates were al-
lowed to land when accompanied by a guard furnished either from
Fort Monroe or from the Navy,
Some weeks after the internment it appears that four officers
from tne Kronpri nz Willielm and two from the Pr inz Eltel, Friedr ich
escaped from the port while on a leave of absence from the shipsf^
All possible efforts were made by the United States authorities
to recover these men but without success, so far as reported.
This incident brings up the interesting question as to what extent
the United States is responsible for the keeping of the crews of
war vessels interned in her ports. Such interned crews are not
prisoners of war. They voluntarily choose to remain in the terri-
tory or jurisdiction of the neutral. The neutral is under obliga-
22. April 21, 1915. See European War. no. 2; p. 129.
23. Taken from the press reports of Qct.14, 1915. It was also re-
ported on June 11 that certain members of the Pr inz Eitel
Friedr ichlcrew escaped during her stay in the harbor before she
was interned, despite the fact Collector Hamilton had Captain
Thierichens' word that he would allow none of his officers or
men to leave the ship without permission from the United States
authorities.
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tion to the other belligerent to exercise due care that the men
remain. The assumption is thst the interned men sought the asylum
of the neutral to escape the results of a conflict with the enemy.
Once they have crossed the boundary they are safe from the attack of
belligerent. Since the belligerent may not pursue nis enemy a-
cross the border, it is manifest that the neutral should exercise
its authority to restrain the forces which sought their safety in
the neutral territory from recrossing and attacking the enemy at <*.
more favorable time.
Ey virtue of the fact that officers are considered to be re-
sponsible agents of their respective Governments, it has become
quite common, if not customary, for the neutral to grant interned
officers certain privileges and liberties. They are frequently
allowed to travel about freely upon giving their word that they
will not leave the country. Since thi3 practice is so common,
it may be doubted whether a belligerent would instigate proceed-
ings for breach of neutrality against a neutral in such a case as
the present one. It is expected the neutral will take due dili-
gence to prevent interned men from escaping, cut as indicated
above, by the general practice of nations, the solemn promise of
the officer is considered to be 'due diligence. "24
While there is universal agreement a3 to the right of a belli-
gerent to intern warships in neutral ports, the right of a belli-
gerent to bring prize ships into neutral ports for safe keeping is
not unanimously conceded. The hospitality once accorded to prize
24. Oftent imes interned officer* and even private sailors are per-
mitted by the enemy to return to their heme country upon giving
their work that they '.".ill not participate in the continuation
of the struggle. There uere examples of this during the
Russo-Japanese War.
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ships has gradually lessened. Professor Wilson^b remarks that
formerly prizes were freely admitted to neutral ports, but in
recent years neutrality proclamations have often forbidden the
privilege. Mr. James Brown Scott after pointing out the objec-
tions of neutrals to their ports being used as depositories for
the spoils of war', by citing the actions of the European nations
during the American Civil Far and the Crimean far comes to the
conclusion that the attitude of neutral nations is against the
admission of prizes, except for humanitarian reasons. «6
Professor WestlakeS? has left a valuable di3ucssion as to
why a prize ship should be treated differently in a neutral port
than a ship which originally belonged to the captor. He says
that a prize sailing under the war flag of her captors stands in
principle, for the purpose of her reception into a neutral port,
on the same footing as if she had originally belonged to her
captors. Eut there ia always the danger of a conflict on board
her between her own crew and the prize crew, and, if she is ac-
25. Naval War College, 1905; pp. -68^69: In 1898 and also in 1904
Great Britain denied all belligerent war vessels the privilege
of taking prizes into ports of the British Dominions. Like-
wise, the French Government in these two wars issued decrees
that no prize vessels would be allowed to enter ports under its
sovereignty except in the case of forced delay ot justifiable
necessity. In 1904, Denmark notified the belligerents that
prizes must not be brought into a Danish harbor or roadstead
except in evident case of stress, nor must prizes be condemned
or sol^ therein. n
26. American Journal of International Law, January 1916; pp. 104-
112. During the Crimean War most of the neutral States except
Austria forbade prizes coming into their ports except unaer
stress, and some forbade them under any circumstances. For
example Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, Oldenburg, Sweden, Denmark,
Belgium, Tuscany, The Two Sicilies, Hanover, and Mecklenburg.
During the Civil War, Great Britain, France
,
Belgium, Nether-
lands, Spain, and Portugal forbade prizes coming into port ex-
cept in case of force maj eure
.
2?. International Law; Vol.11; pp. 213-215.
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companied by a ship of war, of a conflict between the two ships;
and this furnishes a sufficient reason for a special objection
being taken by neutrals to the reception of prizes in their ports.
Indeed, says Professor Westlake, even if the captors are so
superior that no such danger practically exists, their retention
of the prize is a continuous exercise of force over the captured
crew; and no exercise of force can in theory be permitted in
neutral waters.
There i3 no question but that the belligerent may be streng-
thened by the use of neutral ports in which to deposit his prizes.
He not only places some incumbrances upon the neutral, to his own
relief, tut he also recovers his prize crew with a minimum loss
of time; Notwithstanding the fact that this is a means of ren-
dering assistance, there is no rule of international law which
forbids it. The odium of assisting in the war is overcome by im-
partial application on the part of neutrals, that is, the neutral
must admit the prizes of all the nations in the war, if it admits
one. Ha3.1^° is of the opinion that a neutral may permit or
forbid the entry of prizes as it thinks best. He aays, however
until express prohibition is made by the neutral the belliger-
ent ie held to have the privilege not only of placing his prizes
within the security of a neutral harbor, but ' of keeping them there
while the suit for their condemnation is being prosecuted in the
appropriate court. Like most of the writers of the time Hall is
aware that the usual practice in recent times is for neutral
states to restrain belligerents from bringing prizes into their
£8. International Law, 6 Ed. pp. 614-615.
29. See Westlake, International Law, Vol. II, p. 2 13.
30. International Law, Vol. Ill, Sec. 379.

harbors, except in cases of danger or want of supplies.
Judging; the attitude of the United States Government in the
light of the foregoing principle, we must conclude that this
Government has usually taken the view that belligerents have the
right to bring their prizes into neutral ports, for the neutral-
ity proclamations of the United States have not denied the privi-
lege of doing so. ^ Phillimore, 30 in considering the action of
the courts with regard to the matter of allowing prizes to be
brought into neutral ports says, "An attentive review of all the
cases decided in the courts of England and the North American
United States during the last war (1793-1815) leads to the con-
clusion that the condemnation of a capture by a regular prize
court, -sitting in the country of the belligerent, of a prize
lying at the time of the sentence in a neutral port is irregular,
but clearly valid. Thi3 is also the law of France. Even at
this early time, Phillimore&l seems to have looked upon a treaty
made before the outbreak of war as needed to make the reception
of prizes a strictly legitimate act.
We have the position of the United States some years later
(1843) summed up by Mr. Wheaton, then American Minister to
Prussia. In communication with the Secretary of State, Mr.
Wheaton wrote, concerning the Bergen Prizes: "If then, there was
no express prohibition in this case, and if there was no treaty
existing between Denmark and Great Britain by which the former
was bound to refuse to the enemies of the latter these privileges,
then the American cruisers had an unquestionable right to send
their prizes into Danish ports. When cnce arrived there, the
3T7~IbTd, Section 139. See alsc~HalT, Op.CitT'pF. 614rl57 Blunt s-
chli, Volker reoht
,
(Sections 777 and 857) agrees that this is
the exist ing~IawDUt that it is in the course of being changed

neutral Government of Denmark was bound to respect the military
right of the possession, lawfully acquired in war by the captors
on the high seas and continued in the neutral ports into which
the prize was brought. 32 In 185T: Attorney General Cushing ex-
pressed the opinion that the right of asylum in neutral waters
for prizes is presumed where it has not been previously denied.
00
we will next consider the Hague Convention pertaining to
prizes in neutral ports. In Convention Thirteen which deals
with the rights and duties of neutral powers in maritime warfare,
of
.
there are three articles dealing with the disposition^ prizes
in neutral ports. Articles XXI and XXII consider the rights of
prizes in neutral ports to seek shelter from storms, to take on
supplies and provisions; they need not therefore be considered
here. Article XXIII, which deals with prizes in neutral ports
awaiting the decision of the prize court reans as follows:- A
neutral power may allow prizes to enter its ports and roadsteads
whether under convoy or not, when they are brought there to be
sequestrated pending the decision of a prize court. It may have
the prize taken to another of its ports. If the ^rize is con-
voyed by a warship, the prize crew may go aboard the convoying
ship. If the prize is not under convoy, the prize crew are left
at liberty.
The Report of the Conference points out that neutral States
are left free to admit prizes or not. Article XXIII only says
that their neutrality is not compromised if they do admit them
and Keep them; they can make such arrangements as they think fit,
32. Moore, Digest of International Law, VII; p. 982.
33. Ibid; p. 985.
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and remove them to the ^ort most convenient to themselves. w*
This Article is not legally in force because both Great Britain
and Jaxoan reserved Article XXIII in signing the Convention.
Likewise, it did not meet with the approval of the United States;
the Senate in ratifying; the Convention reserved and excluded
Article XXIII. 35
Regardless of the legality of this article it may be said to
represent the majority opinion of nations, and whether ratified
or not, a practical adherence of it would not therefore be condemn
ed in the council of Nations.
The first prize ship in the present war to be brought into an
American port was the Farn . This was a British steamer seized
on her way from Cardiff to Montevideo by the German Cruiser
Karlsruhe, on October 5, 1914. The circumstances of the Farn
are rather unusual. It was laden with coal at the time of
capture, and it appears that a German prize crew was put on board,
and the ship was used as a tender to German warships until Jan-
uary 12, 1915, at which time 3he was sent into the port of San
Jaun, Forte Rico. The ship was interned, and also the prize crew
but not as a prize. The United States seems to have taken the
view that capture and continued possession had made the ship in
fact German owned, and that use by its new owners had made it a
fleet auxiliary. The Farn was therefore interned as an auxiliary
war vessel.^
34. Higgins, The Hague Peace Conference; p. 479.
35. Scott, Text3 cf the Hague Peace Conferences; p. 331.
36. European War No; 2; Op. Cit. p. 140 : An enemy vessel which has
been captured by a belligerent cruiser becomes as between two
Governments the property of the captor without the interven-
tion of a j^rize court. If, said Mr. Lansing, in his note to
the British Ambassador, no prize court is available this Gov-

In the more recent case of the Steamship Appam we have an
example O'f a prize being brought into an American port awaiting
adjudication by the Prize Court. The Appam was captured off
the Canary Islands by the German Converted Cruiser Mo ewe and
sent into Hampton Roads., February 1, 1916 under charge of a
German prize crew. At first there was some doubt as to the
Government's attitude, regarding the Appam'
a
technical status,
but it was decided that the ship should be treated as a prize
of war. 3?
The British Government , true to its traditional belief and
practice that neutrals should not grant the right of asylum
to prizes of war,^e set up the Claim that the Appam should be
released to her British owners. Much might be said, ooth in
justification of and against the action of the United States
in this case. A3 has been pointed out the United States has
never denied the ri=rht of belligerents to bring prizes into
her ports, at the same time there are no records to show that
prizes have been interned in American ports before the present
war. The fact that they have not been brought into American
ports may be largely due to the geographical situation of this
country with respect to the theatre of operations in the great
maritime wars of the past.
ernment doe3 net understand that it is the duty of the captor
to release his prize, or to refuse to impress her into its
service. On the contrary, the captor would be remis3 in
his duty to his Government and to the efficiency of it3 belli-
gerent operations if he released an enemy vessel because he
could not take her in for adjudication.
37. Review of Reviews] March 1916, p. 37S.
38. See Dr . Lushington 's decision in the case of the Polka
(1854), in Roscoe's Prize Cases, Vol.11; pp. 301-502."
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It was announced in the press^>y that the final decision of
the United States Government with regard to the Appam was deter-
mined by the old Treaties of 17S9 and 1828 with Prussia. Mr.
James Brown Scott, 4U relies almost exclusively upon the Hague
Convention,, mentioned above in justifying the action of the
United States, He says, "In as much, as neutrals are admitted
to havs the right to exclude prizes, or to admit them on condi-
tions it is evident that any neutral can enforce articles SI,
22, or 23 of Hague Convention Thirteen if it should so desire,
irrespective of the question whether the Convention is or is
not legally binding.
"
The reason for this proposition being considered at the
Hague was, as Mr. Ran.ault said, 'to render rarer and to pre-
vent, the destruction of prizes. ' By allowing the belliger-
ents to bring prizes into her port3, the United States is, at
least encouraging to some extent the practice of preserving
ships from destruction. The question which confronts the belli-
gerent is not whether or not to capture the enemy's vessels,
out whether or not to destroy them. The reason why the right
of asylum in neutral ports for prizes is not a part of the code
39. The Outlook, February 167^9167^7^350^ Without having ac-
ceSd to the official correspondence, this statement may be
open to doubt. The treaties of 1799 and 1828 made mention
of the receiving of prizes of one by the other of the con-
tracting parties in case the one should be engaged in hostili-
ties. But these treaties were to be in force only a limited
time, not to exceed thirteen years. Furthermore, it was
agreed in Article XIX of the treaty of 1799 that "conformably
to the treaties existing between the United States and Great
Britain, no vessel that shall have made a prize upon British
subjects shall have a right to shelter in" the ports of the
United States, but if forced therein by tempests, etc., they
shall be obliged to depart as soon as possible. " If these
two treaties are applicable it comes from an interpretation
which is not evident upon reading. See Lialloy Treaties and
Conventions, etc. Vol.11, 1776-1909; pp. 1492-1493.
40. American Journal of International Law; January 1916; p. 111.
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of international lav; may be attributed to the selfish interests
of a few of the powerful maritime States, which have ports
of their own conveniently situated in the various part3 of the
world. Thus, it appears that in case of the Appam the United
States, acted not against established American principles in
the premises, and in accord with the provisions of the Hague
Convention ana for the benefit of mankind in the present war.
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